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I. INTRODUCTION
The tort liability of architects' has undergone a nearly full circle evolution
through the history of modem civilization, from the strict liability theory of ancient
Babylon2 to recent attempts to again expose architects to strict liability.3 Under the
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, an architect was liable for any injuries resulting
from a building that he designed. 4 The remedy was harsh: the same injury was
inflicted upon the architect as his building had caused.5 This notion of strict liability
continued under the Roman principle of lex talionis ("an eye for an eye; a tooth for a
tooth' ).6
Later, however, civilizations began to temper this view and limit the architect's
liability. Under the English and early American common law, liability was limited to
instances involving fraud or collusion by the architect. 7 The architect's liability
expanded when the English common law adopted a negligence theory.' American
courts eventually followed. 9 This change, however, did not benefit injured third
parties since an architect was immune from suit when privity of contract' between
the architect and the third party was lacking. In the 1950s the architect in the United
States was still immune from suits by third parties" and under only a limited duty to
those who were in privity of contract.' 2 At this point American courts began the
I. This Note is primarily concerned with the legal status of architects, but the legal analysis is equally applicable to
engineers and, to a lesser extent, design professionals in general. In fact, some of the cases cited herein involved
engineers, indicating that architects and engineers are being exposed to the same liability problems. The legal principles
applicable to one are generally applicable to the other. Allen, Liabilities ofArchitects and Engineers to Third Parties, 22
ARK. L. REV. 454, 454 (1968). But see Rabinowitz v. Hurwitz-Mintz Furniture Co., 19 La. App. 811, 133 So. 498
(1931) (distinguishing architects from engineers).
2. C. EDWARDS, THE HAMMURABI CODE §§ 229-33, at 65-66 (1971).
3. See infra subpart IV(A).
4. C. EDWARDS, supra note 2, §§ 229-33, at 65-66.
5. For example, if a person's child was killed, the architect's child was killed; if an arm was lost, the architect's
arm was removed; and if a third party was killed, the architect was put to death. Id.
6. "The law of retaliation; which requires the infliction upon a wrongdoer of the same injury which he has caused
to another." BLACK's LAW DICnONARY 822 (5th ed. 1979).
7. Note, The Architect's Tort Liability for Personal Injury, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 242, 242 (1968).
8. Collins, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-An Examination of Constitutionality, 29
FEO'N INS. COUNS. Q. 41, 41 (1978).
9. Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir. 1971); see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 30, at
143 (4th ed. 1971); see also infra text accompanying notes 124-39.
10. See Le Lievre v. Gould, I Q.B. 491,497-98 (1893); Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402,404 (Ex. Ch.
1842); see also infra subpart II(A)(1).
1I. See infra subpart II(A)(1).
12. See infra subpart II(A)(2) for a discussion of the expansion of the architect's duty.
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assault on architects' legal status that has left them exposed to increased liability,
including liability to third parties. The extent of this expansion has led some to
conclude that the architect is approaching a legal position similar to that of architects
in ancient Babylon.13
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the recent expansion of the architect's
liability to third parties. This Note will not expressly deal with the architect's
relationship to primary parties, although the discussion may be equally applicable. It
will consider the expansion of an architect's liability for personal injury to third
parties,' 4 including the many sources of the expansion and the appropriateness of
each. 15 In addition, this Note will examine the two primary areas of expansion-(1)
preparation of drawings, plans, and specifications, and (2) construction
supervision-and the architect's role in each of these areas today. 16 Despite the broad
expansion of liability, architects have retained some defenses and other sources of
protection. This Note will analyze these defenses and their effectiveness in light of
recent trends toward expansive liability. 17 Last, this Note will discuss the impact of
the expansion of architectural liability and the possible consequences to the profes-
sion and society if this trend continues.' 8
II. EXPANSION OF LIABILITY
Over the last thirty years architects have been exposed to expanding liability
from a variety of sources. The fall of the privity requirement, 19 abolition of the owner
acceptance rule,20  application of the time of discovery rule to tort statutes of
limitation,2 1 and other changes22 have led to the expansion of the architect's liability
to third parties. Another important element in this expansion is the changing duty of
the architect, a topic that will be discussed later.23
•13. Comment, A Defense Catalogue for the Design Professional, 45 UMKC L. REV. 75.78 n.22 (1976-1977).
14. This Note does not discuss the architect's contract liability, although many of the same principles are applicable.
For a discussion of the architect's liability to third parties for economic injury, see Note, Liabili, of Architects and
Engineers to Third Parties: A New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 306, 309-11 (1977).
15. See infra parts nI-IV.
16. See infra subparts III(B)-(C).
This Note does not attempt to analyze all areas in which architects may be held liable. It will deal only with liability
to third parties with emphasis on the design and supervision functions. See Note, Liability of Designz Professionals-The
Necessity of Fault, 58 IowA L. REv. 1221, 1229 n.49 (1973) for a list of 24 services performed by design professionals,
each of which may draw allegations of negligence.
17. See infra part V.
18. See infra part VI.
19. See infra subpart II(A).
20. See infra subpart 1n(B).
21. See infra subpart II(C).
22. See infra subpart II(D).
23. See infra subparts III(B)-(C).
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A. Fall of Privity
1. Limitation of Potential Plaintiffs
by the Privily Requirement
The doctrine of privity of contract defines the scope of a person's liability to
third parties for the breach of a contract. Under the doctrine, only a party to the
contract may recover for a breach of the contract.2 4 In the context of negligence,
privity of contract has been applied as a limitation on the scope of liability to third
parties for breaches of contractual duties.25 Therefore, liability for negligence has
been limited, in some circumstances, to contracting parties.
For an architect the number of contracting parties is limited. Two contracts are
usually involved: one between the architect and the owner 26 (the party who is
financing the construction) and one between the contractor and the owner.27 The
general privity rule would hold an architect liable only to the owner since the architect
is generally not a party to the contractor-owner agreement. 28 Since third parties, by
definition, are not parties to the contract, the architect would not be liable to them.
Historically, some exceptions were made to the privity requirement in negli-
gence suits based on a contractual duty. One exception applied when a defendant had
made misrepresentations to a third-party plaintiff who was injured as a consequence
of his reasonable reliance on the erroneous information. 29 Another instance when a
third party could recover was when he was held to be a "third-party beneficiary" of
the contract. 30 This theory, which has been applied to architects, 3 1 allowed an injured
24. Note, supra note 14, at 307.
25. Id.
26. See. e.g., AMERICAN INsTrruTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND
ARCHITECT (AIA Document B 141iCM) (1980) [hereinafter cited as AIA Document B141/CM], reprinted in J. LAMBERT
& L. WrTE, HANDBOOK OF MODERN CONsTRucTION LAW at 328 (1982).
27. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTtTUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND
CONTRACTOR (AIA Document AI01/CM) (1980), reprinted in J. LAMBERT & L. WHITE, HANDBOOK OF MODERN
CONsmucrTioN LAW at 236 (1982).
28. Generally, both forms are provided by the architect. Therefore, the owner-contractor agreement may be used to
clear up ambiguities in the owner-architect agreement concerning the architect's responsibilities. Reber v. Chandler High
School Dist. No. 202, 13 Ariz. App. 133, 136, 474 P.2d 852, 855 (1970).
29. See generally Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231 (1966) (discussion of
liability to third parties for misrepresentation). The misrepresentation exception has limited application to architects. To
show misrepresentation, the injured party must have reasonably relied on the erroneous information. W. PROSSER, supra
note 9, § 108, at 714. Generally, the injury will be an economic one, e.g., when a bidder relies on the architect's
information and then suffers an economic loss. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal.
1958). When personal injuries to third parties are at issue, a third party usually will not have had any information
communicated to him by the architect. Thus, the misrepresentation exception appears to be limited to third parties who are
involved to some extent in the construction process.
30. See Note, supra note 16, at 1223.
31. Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 137, 334 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1960). The third-party beneficiary exception,
however, has limited application to architects because of the "'intended benefit" requirement. Third parties related to the
construction project (e.g., construction workers) may find the contracts to be intended for their benefit, but architects are
careful to exclude any language indicating such an intent. The intent required to extend protection to third parties further
removed from the construction process is difficult to find in the contract. In such cases the third party will rely on a
negligence theory with a corresponding duty, which may be provable since privity of contract is no longer required. See
supra text accompanying notes 24-61.
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third party to recover from the breaching party, despite a lack of privity of contract,
when the contract was intended to benefit that third party.32
The early American courts strictly applied the privity requirement,3 3 which was
the most effective defense an architect had to third-party actions for negligence. 34 An
architect did not have to present a defense on the merits unless the plaintiff could
establish the necessary privity of contract.35 The rationale of these cases was that the
architect's duty to use reasonable care was based on his contract with the owner and
that, therefore, this duty did not extend beyond the contracting parties.36 The
protection afforded architects was so effective that professional liability insurance
was not considered necessary until the 1950s.37 The doctrine of privity, however, is
no longer an effective shield for the architect.
The demise of the privity doctrine is of fairly recent origin. The erosion began in
1916 with the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 38 which
eliminated the privity of contract requirement in cases in which a manufacturer was
sued for negligent design of a product. 39 The court held that a manufacturer of a
negligently designed product is liable to anyone who foreseeably might use the
product.4 ° This foreseeability test was later applied to the construction industry. 4
Then, in 1957, in Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority,42 the foreseeability test
was applied to an architect's liability for negligent design. The Inman case arose
when a young child was injured in a fall from a porch that was designed without a
railing. 43 The New York Court of Appeals held that the foreseeability test of
MacPherson was applicable to architects and that privity of contract was no longer
required for an injured party to recover for negligent design.4" The court noted that
"'[the principle inherent in the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. case and those that
have followed it . . . cannot be made to depend upon the merely technical distinction
between a chattel and a structure built upon the land.'-
45
The Inman decision, however, held the architect not liable for the negligent
design because the danger was patent.46 Therefore, the limited holding of Inman was
32. See Note, supra note 16, at 1223 n.l 1 (citing cases). For further consideration of the third-party beneficiary
theory, see generally 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 302-19 (1964).
33. See, e.g.. Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926),
overruled on other grounds. Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
34. Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926); see Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (contractor),
overruled on other grounds. Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
35. Note, supra note 14, at 307. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25 for a definition of privity of contract.
36. See Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (contractor),
overruled on other grounds, Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
37. Note, supra note 14, at 307 n.7 (citing cases).
38. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949) (foreseeability test applied to a case
dealing with the construction of improvements on real property, but the defendant was a contractor, not an architect).
42. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
43. Id. at 142-43, 143 N.E.2d at 897-98, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
44. Id. at 144, 143 N.E.2d at 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.
45. Id. (quoting Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 35, 68 A.2d 517, 533 (1949)).
46. Id. at 145-46, 143 N.E.2d at 899-900, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 704. Patent is defined as "open; manifest: evident." In
this context, it means that which is plainly visible or could be discovered by an inspection with ordinary care. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (5th ed. 1979).
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that an architect was liable only for latent or hidden dangers resulting from his
negligent design. 47 This limitation, however, was not universally adopted.
4 8
Subsequent decisions have been nearly unanimous in extending the architect's,
duty beyond the limits of the privity of contract doctrine. 49 The general rule today is
that privity of contract is no longer a bar to a negligence action against an architect.
50
2. Potential Plaintiffs After the Fall of Privity
The privity doctrine prevented the extension of liability to the full limits of
foreseeability. 51 The decisions that have abolished the privity doctrine have adopted a
foreseeability test to determine a defendant's liability to an injured party.5 2 This test
must be carefully defined, however, since foreseeability carried to its extreme would
result in an architect owing a duty to the entire world.
53
Most courts have not imposed such a universal duty, 54 but have relied on a more
flexible balancing approach that avoids the rigidity of privity yet prevents unlimited
exposure to liability. The California Supreme Court, in Biakanja v. Irving,55 noted
that some public policies favor restricting the scope of the duty owed by a
professional to third parties. The court listed the following considerations: (1) The
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeabil-
ity of the harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that an injury was suffered,
(4) the connection between the conduct and the injury, (5) the moral blame, and (6)
the policy of preventing future harm.
5 6
Application of these considerations to the architect would provide a realistic
view of the proper extent of an architect's liability. Consideration of the extent to
which the construction project is intended to affect the plaintiff would limit liability to
those who are entitled to protection by virtue of being more than a secondary
consideration in the architect's and owner's activities. The foreseeability of harm
element would also give courts the opportunity to limit the extension of the architect's
duty. Most important, consideration of the moral blame for an architect's actions
would allow a determination of just how blameworthy those actions were. Finally,
47. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
48. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.. 44 N.J. 70, 80-81, 207 A.2d 314, 320 (1965). The court held that
knowledge by the plaintiffof a "'dangerous condition [does] not, as a matterof law, preclude a finding of negligence." Id.
at 81, 207 A.2d at 320. Thus, although a danger is patent, liability may not be precluded. See generally 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES. TORTS § 28.5, at 1543 (1956).
49. See, e.g.. Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963); Miller v. DeWitt, 37111. 2d 273.
226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 I1l. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966); Simon v. Omaha Pub.
Power Dist., 189 Neb. 183, 202 N.W.2d 157 (1972).
50, See Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 II1. 2d 273, 226
N.E.2d 630 (1967); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 111. App. 2d 153. 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966); Simon v. Omaha Pub.
Power Dist.. 189 Neb. 183, 202 N.W.2d 157 (1972). Contra Peyronnin Constr. Co. v. Weiss, 137 Ind. App. 417, 208
N.E.2d 489 (1965).
51. Note, supra note 14, at 311.
52. Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351,353, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133, 134-35 (1963); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co.,
78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 162, 222 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (1966).
53. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 350. 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
54. Note, supra note 14, at 313-14.
55. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
56. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
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the deterrence element would allow consideration of how effective the imposition of
liability would be in preventing future harm.5 7 The overall effect of the Biakanja test
is to provide opportunities for an explicit consideration of public policies and a
balancing of those policies to determine the architect's liability. The Biakanja test has
been followed in several cases concerning architects and engineers.
58
Subsequent cases have recommended additional considerations such as the
societal impact of imposing liability on a particular party59 and the burden that would
result to the party if he were held liable. 60 Another approach is to use the Biakanja
case-by-case analysis with the addition of considerations such as the potential for
unlimited liability, the effect of liability on the profession, the relative burden of
prevention, and the ability to bear the lOSS. 6 ' This approach is more acceptable since
it properly recognizes that the benefits architects confer on society may justify
limiting the scope of their duty and, thereby, their liability.
The present trend toward balancing is a justifiable response to the inflexibility of
the privity doctrine. Despite a less than full expansion of the architect's liability,
however, the fall of privity has resulted in the exposure of the architect to a
significantly greater number of potential plaintiffs and, therefore, to greater potential
liability.
B. Owner Acceptance Rule
The abolition of the owner acceptance rule is another important force in the
expansion of the architect's liability to third parties. Under the owner acceptance
rule, an architect is not liable to third parties after a structure has been completed and
accepted by the owner. 62 Therefore, when this rule applies, the architect's negligence
is not an issue.
63
One basis for the rule is that the architect does not owe a duty to third parties. In
Daugherty v. Herzog64 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that a contractor was not
liable to third parties after the owner's acceptance because the contractor owed no
duty to such third parties.65 Thus, the owner acceptance rule often hinged on the
failure of a third party to establish a duty owed by the architect, a failure often due to
a lack of privity of contract. Since privity is no longer required, the issue of duty is
57. See infra text accompanying notes 345-47 for a discussion of the appropriateness of applying a deterrence
rationale to architects.
58. See. e.g., United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Cooperv. Jevne, 56 Cal. App.
3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976); Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).
59. See Komitz v. Earling & Hiller, Inc., 49 Wis. 2d 97, 181 N.W.2d 403 (1970).
60. See A. E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974).
61. Note, supra note 14, at 315-18.
62. See Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (contractor),
overruled, Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457
(1896).
63. See Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D. C. Cir. 1926) (contractor).
overruled, Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457
(1896).
64. 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896).
65. Id. at 257, 44 N.E. at 457.
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not dependent on a contractual relationship. If an injured party can establish a duty,
the lack of duty rationale for the owner acceptance rule is no defense for the architect.
Other rationales, however, might support application of the owner acceptance
rule. One rationale for the rule is preventing the architect from being held liable long
after construction is completed.66 This rationale is based on social and economic
policy considerations that might be better served by other means. 67 Another rationale
for the rule is that the proximate cause of the injury is the owner's negligence in
maintaining the building, not the architect's or contractor's negligence. 68 The
argument is that when the owner accepts the building, the responsibility for the
condition of the premises shifts to the owner because the architect no longer has
control of the structure. The architect can no longer change or correct any defects.
Moreover, the owner is in a better position to discover any defects that might exist.
The owner acceptance rule, if applicable, provides a defense for architects when
they are sued for injuries incurred after the owner's acceptance of the structure. Even
after the fall of the privity requirement, which effectively nullified the lack of duty
rationale for the rule, other rationales were still available to support the rule. The
rule, however, has been abolished in most jurisdictions. The abolition was a gradual
process that began with the application of exceptions to nonliability when the
architect was guilty of fraud or deliberate concealment, 69 when the structure was
inherently or imminently dangerous, 70 and when the structure was a nuisance. 7 1 As
noted above, the demise of the owner acceptance rule paralleled the fall of the privity
requirement since the lack of duty rationale for the rule was often based on a lack of
privity of contract. The justification for abolishing the owner acceptance rule is
unclear. It may simply be the result of a policy determination that architects'
responsibility for their work does not end with a simple shift in control of a structure.
This justification appears sound since architects are responsible, in large part, for the
structure: a fact that is not changed by the owner's acceptance of the structure. The
result is that the owner acceptance rule has little or no impact today. 72 Each case now
turns on whether the architect owed a duty to the injured third party, a question that is
generally answered under the foreseeability test. 73
C. Tine of Discovery Rule
A statute of limitations74 bars a plaintiff's cause of action after a specified lapse
of time and is designed to provide a defending party a fair opportunity to defend
66. Geare v. Sturgis. 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926): Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1926)
(contractor), overruled, Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 86-106 (discussion of special statutes of limitations).
68. See Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Geare v, Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926);
Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (contractor), overruled, Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 257, 44 N.E. 457, 458 (1896).
69. O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364. 125 N.W. 1012 (1910).
70. Johnston v. Long, 56 Cal. App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409 (1943).
71. Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So. 2d 108 (1958).
72. See. e.g., Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 38-61,
74. "Statute of limitations" is used here to refer to both statutory and nonstatutory limitations of actions.
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against the action. 75 In general, statutes of limitations for negligence actions do not
begin to run until some damage or injury occurs. 76 A problem arises, however, when
an injury occurs long after the negligent act. One must determine whether the statute
begins to run at the time of the injury (or damage) or at the time the negligent act
occurred that later caused the injury. The old rule was that the period commenced
from the date of the negligent act, not from the time of the injury.77 When this
standard was applied to architects, the architect was subject to liability for only a
fixed period of time. The injustice that this rule worked on a plaintiff injured after the
statute of limitations had run led to the adoption of the time of discovery rule.
The time of discovery rule commences the running of the statute of limitations
when the alleged wrong is discovered or should have been discovered by the
plaintiff. 78 Many courts have applied the time of discovery rule to negligence actions
besides those against architects, particularly when the negligence is such that an
injury may be likely to occur long after the negligent act. An example of this is a
medical malpractice action. 7
9
The injustice of commencing the period from the date of the alleged wrong and
the likelihood of injuries occurring long after the architect's negligent act have led
many jurisdictions to apply the time of discovery rule to architects and the construc-
tion industry. 80 The decision in Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. Klefstad Engineering
Co.81 limited the application of the time of discovery rule to cases in which the
passage of time has not compounded the problems of proof or increased the danger of
false or fraudulent claims.8 2 Although this holding appears to call for a case-by-case
determination, the decision seems to imply that construction cases as a class are
suited for the time of discovery rule.
The application of the time of discovery rule to an architect subjects him to
potential liability to third parties for the lifetime of the building or structure. 83
Theoretically, an architect could be liable "throughout his professional life and into
retirement." 84 This endless expansion of liability conflicts with the principle that
liability should come to an end. A potential defendant should not be required to
75. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 30, at 144.
76. See White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 276, 18 A.2d 185, 187 (1941); W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 30, at
144.
77. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 168(a) (1948).
78. Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 462, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967).
79. Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Frohs v.
Greene, 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564 (1969); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968).
80. See, e.g., Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. Klefstad Eng'g Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 77, 358 N.E.2d 1295 (1976);
Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967); Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee. 255 Md. 440,
258 A.2d 177 (1969); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 30, at 144.
81. 45 Ill. App. 3d 77, 358 N.E.2d 1295 (1976).
82. Id. at 80, 358 N.E.2d at 1297. The decision also cites other negligence cases in which the time of discovery rule
was applied. See id. at 79-80, 358 N.E.2d at 1296-97.
83. This is subject to the special statutes of limitations enacted by many states. See infra text accompanying notes
86-106.
84. Comment, Limitation ofAction StatutesforArchitecis and Builders-Blueprintsfor Non-Action, 18 CATH. U.L.
REv. 361, 363 (1969).
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defend against stale claims and be forced to rely on faded memories, lost evidence,.
and witnesses who have died or disappeared.85
This conflict has led to the enactment of special statutes of limitations. These
special statutes are the most important weapons an architect has in combatting the
expansion of liability for indefinite periods of time. They have been enacted by many
states86 as a result of pressure on state legislatures by the architectural profession and
the construction industry after the expansion of liability began in the late 1950s. 87 As
noted above, a tort statute of limitations normally does not begin to run until the
defect is discovered,88 but the special statutes typically commence running from the
time of performance of the architect's services 89 or the time of "substantial comple-
tion" of the structure. 90 The special statutes serve to limit the length of time that an
architect is subject to liability, but do not affect his duty to third parties.
While these special statutes are termed "statutes of limitations," they are not. A
statute of limitations normally governs the time within which an action must be
instituted after the cause of action accrues. These special statutes, however, bar any
action after a certain period of time and may bar an action before the cause of action
accrues.
9 1
The special statutes attempt to balance the interests of potential plaintiffs and
potential defendants. Policy considerations favoring these special statutes are (1) that
design professionals should not be subject to liability in perpetuity;92 (2) that the
passage of time prejudices the defendant in his defense;93 and (3) that the question of
improper maintenance by an owner becomes a possibility as the proximate cause of
an injury caused by structural failures. 9 4 The counterconsiderations that argue against
these statutes are (1) that professional liability insurance is available and its cost can
be passed on to the consuming public; 95 (2) that passage of time hinders the plaintiff
equally, if not more, since the plaintiff bears the burden of proof; and (3) that the
plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that the defect, not improper maintenance,
caused the injury.96
The existence of these policy considerations indicates that the statutes properly
should be left to a legislature's discretion. In some states, however, the courts have
85. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); Developments in the
Latt-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
86. See. e.g.. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page 1981). See Comment, supra note 13, at 92 n. 130, for a list
of similar statutes enacted in other states.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
89. See, e.g.. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page 1981).
90. Comment, supra note 13. at 92.
91. See Skinner v. Anderson, 38 III. 2d 455, 458, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 75 & 85.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 395-97 (discussion of the proximate cause defense); see also Comment,
Recent Statutory Developments Concerning the Limitation ofActions Against Architects, Engineers and Builders, 60 Ky.
L.J. 462. 468 (1972) (sets forth the policy considerations noted in text accompanying notes 92-94).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 444-48.
96. Comment, supra note 94, at 468.
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become involved, holding several of these special statutes unconstitutional, 97 fre-
quently on equal protection98 or due process grounds. 99 Legislatures have made their
intent to determine proper policy in this area clear; at least two state legislatures have
reenacted special statutes of limitations after their state courts had held them
unconstitutional. 10 0 One statute was reenacted without revision, but with a statement
of legislative purpose attached. 10 1
The special statutes of limitations are a pervasive 10 2 and tenacious feature of the
law concerning an architect's liability. They are the architect's most effective weapon
against the perpetual liability resulting from application of the time of discovery
rule. 103 These special statutes are "realistic and necessary" because of the longevity
of an architect's work. 104 Although some would argue that the balance has swung too
far in protecting the design professional, the special statutes clearly reflect the
importance of the contributions that architects make to society.' 05 While these special
statutes appear to be firmly entrenched in the American legal system, they are not
beyond attack, and an architect should not rely solely on them for protection.
10 6
D. Other Elements of the Expansion of Liability to Third Parties
The workers' compensation system in this country has affected the architect's
current legal status, particularly his relation to construction workers. 107 In most
states, when a worker is injured the workers' compensation program is the exclusive
remedy of the worker against his employer.' 08 Even in those jurisdictions where the
program is not the exclusive remedy, an employee relinquishes his common-law right
to sue his employer for an injury when the employee receives benefits from the
program.'0 9 In addition, 'the benefits provided under these programs are usually
97. See, e.g., Plant v. R. L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975) (void for vagueness); Overland
Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (denies access to the courts under the Florida Constitution); Skinner
v. Anderson, 38 I11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (grants to architects and contractors a special qr exclusive immunity
in violation of the Illinois Constitution); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) (destroys common-law rights of
action in violation of the Kentucky Constitution); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d
454 (1975) (unreasonable immunity under the Wisconsin Constitution).
98. See, e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
99. See, e.g., Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
100. See Act of May 17, 1980, ch. 70, 1980 Hawaii Sess. Laws 94 (codified at HAwAtt REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp.
1982)) (declared unconstitutional, despite the revised reenactment, in Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 65 Hawaii 26,
647 P.2d 276 (1982)); Act of July 2, 1980, 1980 Fla. Laws 1389 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.1 1(3)(c) (West
1982)).
101. Act of July 2, 1980, 1980 Fla. Laws 1389, 1390 (preamble of new statute contains a statement that the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Overland was contrary to "the best interest of the people of the state").
102. See Comment, supra note 13, at 92 n.130 (list of statutes).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
104. Comment, supra note 13, at 93.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 438-39.
106. These special statutes are more extensively discussed in other legal commentaries. For more complete analyses,
see Collins, supra note 8; Ellison, Statutory Termination of Perpetual Liability for Design and Construction Negligence,
in GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE at General Information-38 (Victor 0. Schinnercr & Co. ed. 198 1); Comment,
supra 'note 84; Comment, supra note 94.
107. For a general discussion of the nature of workers' compensation laws, see I A. LARSON, THE LAw OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1.10, 2.00, 2.20, 2.30, 2.40, 2.50 (1982).
108. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. It, § 35; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1980).
109. See I A. LARSON, supra note 107, § 1.10.
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limited to medical expenses and partial compensation for the loss or impairment of
the income producing ability of the plaintiff." 0 Workers are not compensated for
losses such as pain and suffering and disfigurement, losses that are recoverable under
traditional tort theories. "1 The inadequacy of the benefits under this exclusive system
has led many workers to seek compensation from other sources. Although an
employer is immune from suit under the workers' compensation laws, a third party
such as an architect is not protected; a worker retains the common-law right to sue a
third party, including an architect." 2
The inadequacy of the workers' compensation system has made the architect a
prime target in the injured construction worker's search for a "deep pocket." The
two traditional barriers to a worker's recovery against the architect were the privity
requirement and a refusal by the judiciary to extend the architect's supervisory duty to
include the safety of construction methods. 113 Both the privity requirement114 and the
judiciary's position on supervisory duty 1 5 have been weakened so that the architect'
has become subject to suits by injured workers, thus further expanding the architect's
liability.
The social climate in this country also contributes to the architect's expanding
liability and may be responsible for some of the policy changes indicated in the
discussions above. 116 The American people have become a litigious society; litiga-
tion seems to be the primary course of action that people seek when they are injured
or damaged. In many cases the search for a "deep pocket" may include the
architect. 7 The availability of liability insurance has been both a cause and an effect
of the architect's expanding liability. As many long-standing defenses began to
wither, the need for insurance and its availability increased. 118 As the availability of
liability insurance increased, the architect increasingly became the target of injured
persons seeking a party from whom they could recover.
The expansion of the architect's liability over the years is a product of a
combination of the factors discussed above. This expansion has not been uniform; the
impact of the changes on the various theories of liability differs. These theories are
discussed below with particular emphasis on the negligence theory.
110. Id.
III. Note. supra note 16, at 1239.
112. See I A. LARSON. supra note 107, § 1.10.
113. Note, supra note 16, at 1239-40.
114. See supra subpart 1(A).
115. See infra subparts III(B)-(C).
116. See Ames, Professional Liability: Where the Problems Lie, CONSULTING ENGINEER, Aug. 1977, at 83 (lists
such factors as the consumer movement, the social climate favoring strict liability, liberal courts, zealous plaintiff's
attorneys, and the availability of liability insurance as causes of the increased number of claims against architects and
builders).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 340-44 for a discussion of the architect's appropriateness as a "deep
pocket."
118. Note, supra note 14, at 307.
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III. THE NEGLIGENCE THEORY
When a third party sues an architect, the suit is typically a negligence action,
although the plaintiff may plead several theories." 9 It is important, therefore, to
consider negligence theory and its relation to the architect's services and functions.
A. Elements of the Negligence Theory
At English common law an architect was held liable for personal injury only on a
finding of negligence and a contractual relationship between the alleged tortfeasor
and the injured party.12 0 As already discussed, the privity requirement is no longer
essential to establishing liability. 12' To recover against an architect for negligence,
the plaintiff must prove the four standard elements of negligence: 122 (1) that the
plaintiff was protected by a rule of law from the architect's conduct (duty), (2) that
the architect's conduct violated this duty (breach), (3) that the injury was a result of
the architect's conduct (proximate cause), and (4) that the plaintiff suffered a loss
(damage). 123
The duty element is expressed by a standard of care that defines an architect's
quantitative' 24 and qualitative 125 obligations to third parties. The question of duty
comprises two issues: first, the nature of the architect's duty, and second, a
determination of those to whom the architect owes that duty. The courts have been
nearly unanimous in adopting the view that a duty is owed to all who may foreseeably
be injured by the architect's failure to fulfill a duty. 12 6 Foreseeability, however, is
subject to interpretation and does not provide an easily applied test. 127
The general definition of the architect's duty has developed over time into a
clearly stated principle. In Bayne v. Everham'28 the Supreme Court of Michigan held
that an architect "'must possess and exercise the care and skill of those ordinarily
skilled in the business."' 1 29 The court analogized that an architect, like a lawyer or
physician, "has done all the law requires" "[w]hen he possesses the requisite skill
and knowledge, and in the exercise thereof has used his best judgment."' 30 This
principle has been accepted in most jurisdictions.' 3'
119. See infra part IV.
120. Note, supra note 16, at 1222.
121. See supra subpart II(A).
122. Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir. 1971); W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 30, at 143.
123. See Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir. 1971).
124. The term "quantitative" is used to refer to how long and to how many a duty is owed.
125. The term "qualitative" is used to refer to the nature of the duty itself. It relates specifically to the standard of
care to which an architect will be held.
126. E.g., Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill.
App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
127. See supra subpart II(A)(2).
128. 197 Mich. 181, 163 N.W. 1002 (1917).
129. Id. at 199-200, 163 N.W. at 1008.
130. Id. at 200, 163 N.W. at 1008; see also Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 640, 76 N.W. 62, 62 (1898).
131. E.g., Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs., Inc., 168 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163, 166, 144 S.E.2d 450,453 (1965); Coombs v. Beede.
89 Me. 187, 188, 36 A. 104, 105 (1896); Cowles v. City of Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452, 453-54, 151 N.W. 184. 185
(1915); Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co., 217 Or. 323, 331-32,341 P.2d 1083, 1086-87 (1959); Shipman v. State. 43 Wis. 381
(1877).
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The clearest definition of the architect's duty is found in Paxton v. Alameda
County,'32 in which a California appellate court approved the following jury
instruction, which had been given by the trial court:
"By undertaking professional service to a client, an architect impliedly represents that
he possesses, and it is his duty to possess, that degree of learning and skill ordinarily
possessed by architects of good standing, practicing in the same locality. It is his
further duty to use the care ordinarily exercised in like cases by reputable members of
his profession practicing in the same locality; to use reasonable diligence and his best
judgment in the exercise of his skill and the application of his learning, in an effort to
accomplish the purpose for which he is employed. . . . The standard is that set by the
learning, skill and care ordinarily possessed and practiced by others of the same
profession in the same locality, at the same time."'' 33
The court also held that if an architect's actions are within this standard, no finding of
negligence results even if mistakes were made.' 34 This rule seems to be based on the
view that an architect is not a warrantor of his work and is only required to meet the
reasonable standard of care established by law.
The court in Paxton applied a standard of care based on the practices of
architects in the same locality. 135 Other jurisdictions have applied a more general
standard without limiting it to a certain locality. 136 The importance of this variation is
unclear, but application of a strict locality standard may result in a significantly
greater or lesser duty if a certain locality maintains a different quality of practice than
the profession in general.
137
The standard set forth in Paxton clearly defines the standard of care in general
terms, but to recover, a plaintiff must establish the specific standard required of the
defendant architect. This is accomplished by the introduction of expert opinion
evidence. 138 Expert opinion testimony is generally sufficient to raise a jury question
of whether the standard of care has been met by the defendant architect. 139
Expert testimony protects an architect. It allows a reliable, objective determina-
tion of what is reasonable, rather than allowing a jury to make a subjective decision
about how the architect should perform.' 40 The requirement of expert testimony,
132. 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953).
133. Id. at 398-99, 259 P.2d at 938.
134. Id. at 406, 259 P.2d at 942.
135. Id. at 399, 259 P.2d at 938; see also Davidson, The Liability of Architects, TRIAL, June 1977, at 20, 22.
136. See, e.g.. Seller v. Levitz Furniture Co., 367 A.2d 999. 1008 (Del. 1976) (standard of "ordinary skill and
ability in his profession" (emphasis added)).
137. This issue has had particular importance in medical malpractice cases. Under a "'strict locality rule," a
physician or surgeon can be held only to the degree of diligence, learning, and skill possessed by physicians in the
particular locality of his practice. 61 At,. JUR. 2D Physicians. Surgeons. and Other Healers § 218 (1981). A problem
arises when a certain locality has substandard medical practice. Expert witnesses will all present evidence consistent with
the low standard of practice, thus perpetuating that standard. A more serious problem occurs when only a sole practitioner
practices in a locality, and that practitioner alone can testify about the local standard. As the only practitioner in the
locality, negligence cannot be found under a "strict locality rule" since the sole practitioner's actions are the standard
itself. See id.
138. Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163. 144 S.E.2d 450 (1965). But see Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that certain duties of an architect are within
the common knowledge of ordinary people and, therefore, require no expert evidence).
139. See Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163. 144 S.E.2d 450 (1965); Willner v. Woodward, 201 Va.
104. 109 S.E.2d 132 (1959); Hommel v. Badger State Inv. Co.. 166 Wis. 235, 165 N.W. 20 (1917).
140. However, juries may be making these types of subjective judgments despite the use of expert testimony.
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however, does present problems. Professionals who furnish skilled services should
have wide discretion in determining what practices and principles are best suited for
the work they do. 14' In the architectural profession answers often are not "right" or
"wrong." Instead, the architect must make judgments based on his opinion under the
circumstances. 142 Because of this subjective element, it is often difficult to say what
the "ordinary and reasonable" standard is. This difficulty may lead an expert witness
to offer something other than a standard within the profession.
When an individual undertakes to testify about the limits of acceptable and
reasonable design standards, he must be fully acquainted with the relevant practices
employed by a broad range of his fellow professionals.' 43 Even if an architect has
such knowledge, he must be careful to consider all the facts and circumstances
weighed by the architect in question before he can fairly render an expert opinion
about whether the architect has met the professional standard. " When applying a
community standard, an expert witness must take care not to become a self-
proclaimed authority on community standards based solely on his own practices in
that community, but must know the standards of conduct of other architects in the
community. 145 The key to expert witnesses, then, is that they express an informed
opinion on the standard of the profession, not their personal standard.
The professional standard of care may not be the sole test applied. In some
instances an architect may be held to a higher standard under a theory of strict
liability, warranty, or negligence per se. The role of each of these theories in an
architect's liability will be discussed later. 146
Although a general standard of care applicable to architects clearly exists, its
application and effect depends on the context in which it is to be applied. Therefore,
the architect's services and functions must be examined in determining his duty. The
two most prominent and important services and functions are (I) preparing plans and
specifications, and (2) supervising construction, both of which are examined below.
B. Preparation of Plans and Specifications
The architect's preparation of plans and specifications, the design function, is
the most basic of the architect's services. Traditionally, the architect is viewed as a
designer of buildings. The preparation of plans and specifications is an integral part
of the architect's function and may give rise to legal problems for the architect. 147
The design function is not a simple process. Broyles v. Brown Engineering
Co. 14 8 described an architect's duties as follows:
141. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Cerny & Assocs., 199 F. Supp. 951, 953 (D. Minn. 1961).
142. Anderson, Duties of an Expert Witness, in GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING PI.AcrIcE at General Informuation-2
(Victor 0. Schinnerer & Co. ed. 1971).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at General Infornation-2(2).
146. See infra subparts IV(A)-(C).
147. See Note, supra note 16, at 1229 n.49, for a list of 24 services performed by design professionals, each of
which could be the basis for allegations of negligence.
148. 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963).
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Architects must have as a part of their competency a keen aesthetic sense to enable
them to design structures of beauty and dignity; they must have a technical knowledge
of many structural factors which lend strength and stability to their designs. The
materials they recommend for use are produced by agencies beyond the control and
influence of the architect. His work is to a certain degree experimental or depends on
the experiments and on production of materials by others. Then, too, the law of
physics, gravity and the rotation of the earth, must, in many projects, be taken into
account. 1
49
The architect is charged with designing a structure that is structurally sound,
practical, and aesthetically pleasing. The architect must first create a design that
satisfies the above criteria and then must communicate this design to others through
drawings, sketches, plans, models, and specifications.' 50 An architect must satisfy
many design requirements; he also must satisfy legal requirements relating to his
design function.
The general definition of the architect's duty to provide a safe design was
established in Paxton v. Alameda County.' 5 1 According to Paxton, an architect may
be held liable if he fails to exercise due care in the preparation of plans.' 2 Recent
decisions show an increasing willingness of courts and juries to find that architects
have breached this duty, and the result has been an expanding liability of architects to
third parties. 153
Paxton arose when a construction worker was injured in a fall from the roof of a
building designed by the defendant architect. 154 The court held that the architect was
not negligent and had used reasonable care, even though the design departed from the
customary practice.' 55 The Paxton court apparently could have found the architect
negligent, and the reluctance to so find might be evidence of a preference for
architects.
In many other cases, however, architects have been held liable for breaching the
professional standard of care. 156 For example, in Montijo v. Swift' 57 an action was
brought against an architect for the negligent design of a stairway at a bus depot. The
plaintiff, who had fallen and been injured while descending the stairs, alleged that the
architect was negligent in designing a stairway on which the handrails did not extend
to the bottom of the steps, thereby creating a false illusion that the bottom of the stairs
had been reached. 158 The court found that whether the architect had breached his duty
to exercise ordinary care was a question of fact to be determined upon remand at
trial.' 59 In Mai Kai, Inc. v. Colucci16° an architect was held liable to a restaurant
149. Id. at 39, 151 So. 2d at 771.
150. Note, supra note 16, at 1230-31 contains a description of the architect's design function.
151. 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953). See supra text accompanying note 133 for a statement of this
standard.
152. 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 398-99, 259 P.2d 934, 938 (1953).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 157-63 & 188.
154, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393. 397, 259 P.2d 934, 937 (1953).
155. Id. at 406, 259 P.2d at 942.
156. See, e.g., Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351,33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963); Mai Kai, Inc. v. Colucci, 186 So.
2d 798 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1966); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 III. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
157. 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963).
158. Id. at 351-52, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
159. Id. at 353. 33 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
160. 186 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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patron who was injured because of the architect's negligent design of a counterweight
supporting an exhaust fan. The lengthening of the counterweight had caused in-
creased strain on a defective weld, and the architect was held liable even though he
was not responsible for the defective weld. 161 An architect was again held liable for
his design in Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co. 162 The architect had designed a hollow
concrete block pylon that fell on the plaintiff during a severe storm, and the finding of
negligence was based on the designer's failure to use a heavy-weight concrete block
with a greater wind safety factor.'
63
As these cases indicate, an architect will be held negligent in his design function
if the court or jury finds that he has failed to satisfy an established standard of care.' 64
One must remember, however, that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and this
burden is not automatically satisfied by an allegation of negligence.
The four basic elements of negligence' 65 are applicable to an architect's
preparation of plans and specifications, but a more simplified statement of the
plaintiff's burden has evolved in claims of negligent design. The plaintiff must
essentially establish that "the architect failed to exercise the degree of skill and care
required by the standards of his profession in the preparation of the plans and
specifications, . . . the plans and specifications were substantially followed by the
contractor, and . . . the defect in the plans was the proximate cause of [the]
plaintiff's injury." 166
The first element relates directly to the prior discussion of the architect's
duty.' 67 The plaintiff must establish the standard of care and the accompanying duty,
and then must establish the failure of the architect to satisfy that standard. Absent a
breach of this standard of care no recovery is possible.
The second element is similar to the proximate cause issue, but is just the first
step in the process of determining whether a causal connection exists. 68 If a plan is
defective, but the contractor does not follow it, the architect should not be liable for
injuries to third parties because causation is lacking. In Bayne v. Everham169 the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that the plaintiff must prove that a building was
actually or substantially built according to the defective design to establish the
liability of the architect to the third party based on defective plans. 70
161. Id. at 799.
162. 78 III. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
163. See id. at 163, 222 N.E.2d at 589.
164. Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963); Mai Kai, Inc. v. Colucci, 186 So. 2d 798
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 11. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
165. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
166. Crisham, Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties, 26 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 177, 184 (1976).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 124-39.
168. While an injured third party may be able to show that the architect breached his duty by failing to satisfy the
applicable standard of care and that the plans were followed by the contractor, this showing would not absolutely
determine the proximate cause relationship. Such evidence may establish a connection and possibly a causal connection,
but it does not necessarily establish proximate cause.
169. 197 Mich. 181, 163 N.W. 1002 (1917).
170. Id. at 197, 163 N.W. at 1007; Allen, supra note 1, at 458.
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Despite this clear holding, a plaintiff may still maintain a negligence action
when the plans were not followed if he can show that the plans were ambiguous.' 71 In
Covil v. Robert & Co. Associates 72 a Georgia appellate court upheld a finding of
negligence because ambiguity in the architect's plans resulted in a deviation from the
plans by the contractor. The court held that "[e]ven if the contractor's in-
terpretation ... constituted negligence of the contractor ... this would not absolve
[the architect], for [the architect] must be held to have anticipated the in-
terpretation."173 One must remember, however, that an architect may be absolved of
liability if a substantial variance was made by the contractor that alone caused the
injury. 174 In some instances, the contractor's deviation may be so great that, despite
ambigious plans, the architect could not be "held to have anticipated the in-
teroretation." 
175
Last, to establish the architect's liability for negligent preparation of plans, the
plaintiff must prove that the defect in the plans was the proximate cause of the injury.
In Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp. 176 the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied
recovery to a plaintiff whose husband was killed by an explosion of a boiler.1
77
Although the court implied that the architect may have been negligent in his design, it
denied recovery because the design was not followed and, therefore, was not the
proximate cause of the injury.' 78
The proximate cause element is closely related to several common defenses or
answers made by architects when charged with negligent design. 179 One defense is
that the owner or contractor has approved the plans and, therefore, liability attaches
solely to the owner or contractor. 180 This attempt to establish that another person
assumed responsibility has been largely ineffective. 18 1 Approval of plans does not
ordinarily excuse the architect from liability for exercising less than ordinary and
reasonable care in the preparation of those plans. 182 Similarly, the defense that a
contractor negligently failed to discover a defect in the plans has not been effective to
171. Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163, 144 S.E.2d 450 (1965).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 168, 144 S.E.2d at 454.
174. Allen, supra note 1, at 458.
175. Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163, 168, 144 S.E.2d 450, 454 (1965).
176. 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961).
177. Id.
178. See id. at 309, 128 So. 2d at 668.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 395-97 (discussion of proximate cause as a defense to negligence actions).
180. See Simpson Bros. Corp. v. Merrimac Chem. Co., 248 Mass. 346, 349, 142 N.E. 922, 922-23 (1924);
Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni Constr. Co., 401 Pa. 358, 362, 164 A.2d 201, 203 (1960).
181. See, e.g., Simpson Bros. Corp. v. Merrimac Chem. Co.. 248 Mass. 346, 349, 142 N.E. 922, 922-23 (1924);
Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni Constr. Co., 401 Pa. 358, 362, 164 A.2d 201, 203 (1960).
182. Simpson Bros. Corp. v. Merrimac Chem. Co., 248 Mass. 346. 349, 142 N.E. 922, 922-23 (1924);
Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni Constr. Co., 401 Pa. 358, 362, 164 A.2d 201, 203 (1960). The decision in
Bloomsburg Mills clearly demonstrates that an architect cannot avoid liability by seeking the approval of another and that
the architect's duty is one not easily delegated.
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absolve the architect of liability for defective plans.1 83 This rule also applies when the
architect attempts to base his defense on a city building inspector's negligent approval
of a design.
184
Another common defense is for the architect to claim that the negligence was
committed by an independent contractor to whom the architect had delegated the
preparation of plans. This also has found little support as a defense.' 85 An architect is
under a duty to provide for the safety of others and is "subject to liability to [those]
for whose protection the duty is imposed." 18 6 If the harm is caused by the failure of
care of an independent contractor who is employed by the architect to provide these
safeguards, the architect is still liable.'
87
The duty of an architect to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
preparation of plans and specifications is strict and is not easily dismissed. Although
the architect's liability is tempered by a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff, the
architect is still subject to extensive liability relating to the preparation of plans and
specifications. In most cases in which a third party is injured because of a defect in
plans or specifications, "no haven where an architect . . . may safely take cover"
exists. 188
C. Supervision of Construction
The architect's duty in preparing plans and specifications is fairly well es-
tablished, but the architect's duty of supervision is the subject of a great deal of
controversy. Courts differ about what is or should be included in the architect's duty
to supervise.' 89 The architect's duty to supervise encompasses two distinct areas: (1)
supervision to prevent deviations from the plans and specifications, 190 and (2)
supervision of construction methods and techniques.1 9 1 The duty of the architect in
each of these areas will be discussed to determine when the duty may arise.
Determining an architect's duty to supervise is significantly more difficult than
determining the duty to use reasonable care in preparing plans and specifications. The
183. Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163, 168. 144 S.E.2d 450, 454 (19651; Chiaverini v. Vail. 61
R.I. 117, 119, 200 A. 462, 463 (1938).
184. Johnson v. Salem Title Co., 246 Or. 409, 411-12, 425 P.2d 519, 521 (1967).
185. Id. at 409, 425 P.2d at 519. The holding in Johnson was based on a finding that the architect had a
nondelegable duty to the injured party and, therefore, was liable for the negligence of the independent contractor in not
complying with a building code requirement. Id. at 413-14, 425 P.2d at 522. When the court does not find a nondelegable
duty, however, the architect's liability will depend on whether the other party is an independent contractor or an agent of
the architect. The general rule is that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the contractor's
negligence. Winniford v. MacLeod, 68 Or. 301, 136 P. 25 (1913); W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 71, at 468. An employer
is generally liable, however, for his agent's negligence. See generally American S. Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., 275 Ala.
51, 151 So. 2d 783 (1963).
186. Johnson v. Salem Title Co., 246 Or. 409, 413-14, 425 P.2d 519, 522 (1967); see Allen, The Plight of the
Design Professional Today. in GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE at General Information-9 (Victor 0. Schinnerer&
Co. ed. 1972). But see supra note 185.
187. Allen, supra note 186, at General Information-9(2).
188. Id. at General Information-9(l).
189. See infra text accompanying notes 194-202, 263-89.
190. See infra subpart III(C)(l).
191. See infra subpart IlI(C)(2).
[Vol. 45:217
ARCHITECTURAL LIABILITY
courts must closely examine the relationships and transactions between the architect,
owner, and contractor to determine the allocation of the supervisory responsibilities.
Absent a contractual duty to supervise, the architect is generally not required to be
present during the construction phase.' 92 Occasionally an architect will desire limited
supervisory duties, but, as noted by one commentator, "an owner generally wants to
be sure that his building is put up as designed and who [is] better to see that this is
done than the designer, to wit, the architect."
193
Architects' views of their role in the construction process vary. The architects
who favor an active role contend that the most complete set of construction drawings
"can never express the entire design concept. "194 These architects believe that
without an active role in the construction process, "the design concepts will not be
executed." 195 This activist school of thought is based on the traditional role of the
architect as the provider of complete services to the client, including complete
supervision during the construction phase.' 96 The traditional role came into existence
at a time when buildings were relatively uncomplicated and the architect was in effect
both the designer and the superintendent of construction.' 97 In some cases the
architect was also the contractor. 198 As a result of this tradition, many owners assume
that the architect will provide complete supervision. 9 9
At the other extreme are architects who favor a passive role. As structures have
become more complicated and designs more technically demanding, the design
professional has become less concerned with the day-to-day operations of con-
struction.2 ° ° Therefore, the proponents of a passive role for architects claim that they
"are not skilled at construction administration and supervision," 20 1 and further, that
if they become too heavily involved in the construction process they may be held
"responsible for everything that goes wrong."- 202 From the discussion to follow it
appears that these fears are well founded.
The standard of care applicable to an architect's supervision is generally that
care ordinarily required of "a professional skilled architect under the same or similar
circumstances in carrying out his technical duties in relation to the services un-
192. See Duggan v. Arnold N. May Builders, Inc., 33 Wis. 2d 49. 53, 146 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1966).
193. Goodin. Architects and Malpractice. 34 INs. CouNs. J. 290, 292 (1967).
194. J. SwEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 122 (1970).
195. Id.
196. See. e.g., Schreiner v. Miller, 67 Iowa 91. 24 N.W. 738 (1885); Louisiana Molasses Co. v. Le Sassier, 52 La.
Ann. 2070. 28 So. 217 (1900). These cases indicate the extensive role that the architect historically played in the
construction process.
197. See Schreiner v. Miller, 67 Iowa 91, 24 N.W. 738 (1885).
198. See Louisiana Molasses Co. v. Le Sassier, 52 La. Ann. 2070. 28 So. 217 (1900).
199. See J. SwEET. supra note 194, at 122.
200. Note, supra note 16, at 1237.
201. J. SwEET, supra note 194. at 122.
202. Note. Supervisory Duties of an Architect. 3 MESI. ST. U.L. REV. 139, 139 (1972); see J. SWEEr, supra note
194, at 122.
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dertaken by his agreement." 20 3 This standard is accepted by most jurisdictions2°4 and
applies whenever a duty of supervision exists. 20 5 Establishing the existence of that
duty is the vital inquiry.
The employment of an architect is generally a matter of contract and the terms of
employment are governed by the terms of the contract. Therefore, the courts must
closely examine the contractual relationship between the architect and the owner to
determine what supervisory duties exist before they can determine if the architect has
been negligent in discharging those duties.
1. Supervision to Assure Substantial Conformity
with the Plans and Specifications
The least controversial supervisory duty is the duty to assure that the building or
structure is constructed substantially according to the architectural plans. Whether an
architect supports a passive or active role in supervision of the construction process, it
is clear that in most jurisdictions "the architect does owe some duty . . . to see that
the building ends up built substantially according to the plans and specifications. "206
Any deviation from the plans by the contractor may be evidence that the architect was
negligent in his duty to supervise for substantial conformity. 207
The importance of this supervisory duty is clear from the cases that set forth this
duty. One of the earliest cases dealing with the architect's duty to see that a building
is constructed according to the plans was Schreiner v. Miller.20 8 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Iowa found that an architect had a duty to assure substantial
conformity. 20 9 The court also held the architect to a duty to use reasonable care in
construction methods, but this was at a time when the architect was regarded as the
sole superintendent of the project.2 10
The leading case on the nature of the architect's responsibility to supervise
construction is Clinton v. Boehm.2 11 In Clinton, a New York Appellate Division
Court held that the "very utmost obligation" assumed by the architect was "to see
that the building was properly constructed" and, generally, to see that the owner
received the building for which he contracted.212
203. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 1968).
204. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968); Peerless Ins.
Co. v. Cerny & Assocs., 199 F. Supp. 951 (D. Minn. 1961); Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163, 144
S.E.2d 450 (1965); Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104 (1896); Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N.W. 62
(1898); Cowles v. City of Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452, 151 N.W. 184 (1915); Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co.. 217 Or. 323,
341 P.2d 1083 (1959); Willner v. Woodward, 201 Va. 104, 109 S.E.2d 132 (1959).
205. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 1968).
206. Goodin, supra note 193, at 292; see Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472,474
(8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Dysart-Cook Mule Co. v.
Reed & Heckenlively, 114 Mo. App. 296, 299, 89 S.W. 591,592-93 (1905); Clemens v. Benzinger, 211 A.D. 586. 590.
207 N.Y.S. 539, 543 (1925).
207. See Johnson v. O'Neill, 172 Mich. 334, 339, 137 N.W. 713, 715-16 (1912).
208. 67 Iowa 91, 24 N.W. 738 (1885).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 92-93, 24 N.W. at 738; see supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
211. 139 A.D. 73, 124 N.Y.S. 789 (1910).
212. Id. at 75, 124 N.Y.S. at 792; see also Olsen v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 10 A.D.2d 539, 205 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1960), affd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 829, 175 N.E.2d 350, 215 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1961).
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One unsettled issue is whether the architect must have notice of the contractor's
deviation to be held liable for negligent supervision. In Paxton v. Alameda
Counly2 13 a California appellate court held that an architect was under a duty to
supervise with reasonable care when he was put on notice that the contractor had
deviated or was about to deviate from the architect's plans. 2 14 The court found that
the architect was under a duty in these circumstances to make certain that the situation
was corrected. 215 In Lotholz v. Fiedler,2 16 however, an Illinois appellate court held
that an architect should have prevented a variance from the plans, even though he had
no knowledge of the deviation, which was impossible for him to see. 217 In this case
the lack of a notice requirement made the duty to supervise for conformity an
extremely difficult standard to satisfy. Nevertheless, the tendency is apparently to
find liability despite a lack of notice.2 18
Many cases have established that an architect has a duty to ensure a building's
conformity with its design. Some jurisdictions have held that architects have too
much authority over contractors and job progress to be immune from liability. 219
Others have based the duty on the novel features involved in a design.2 2 ° In Bayuk v.
Edson221 a California appellate court found that the contract between the architect and
owner did not include supervision.222 The court held, however, that the "novel and
untried features . . . required close supervision." 223 The court apparently implied a
duty based on the importance of supervision in assuring that an owner receives the
building for which he contracts.
The recognition by the courts of a supervisory duty to prevent deviations from
the plans and specifications is supported by the architectural profession itself. The
terms in form contracts frequently used by architects, such as the American Institute
of Architects' Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect,224 show
that architects recognize the duty to supervise for building conformity. According to
these forms, "The Architect shall visit the site at intervals appropriate to the stage of
construction . . . to become generally familiar with the progress and quality of Work
and to determine in general if Work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract
Documents."- 225 Clearly, then, the architectural profession recognizes a duty to
supervise to prevent deviations from designs, but even this has not settled the issue.
Architects would like to limit liability for failure to conform to this supervisory
duty to cases in which they are at least aware or on notice of the deviation and the
213. 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953).
214. Id. at 410, 259 P.2d at 944-45.
215. Id.
216. 59 III. App. 379 (1895).
217. Id. at 380-81.
218. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
219. Allen. supra note 1, at 460.
220. See. e.g.. Bayuk v. Edson, 236 Cal. App. 2d 309, 316, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49, 54 (1965).
221. 236 Cal. App. 2d 309, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1965).
222. Id. at 312, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
223. Id. at 316, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 54; see also Note, supra note 202, at 141.
224. AIA Document BI41/CM, supra note 26.
225. Id. § 1.5.4.
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dangers it presents.22 6 As noted earlier, however, Lotholz v. Fiedler227 held an
architect liable for a variance from the plans even though it was impossible for the
architect to see it. 228 Subsequently, another court held that an engineer should have
been aware of a deviation from his design, even though he had no notice of the
variance. 229 Architects have attempted through disclaimers2 3° to limit liability for
these unknown deviations, but the effectiveness of the disclaimers is left to the
ultimate determination of the courts. Given the trend toward findings of negligence,
the disclaimers may not be very effective. 23
1
Although the details of the duty to supervise to assure substantial conformity
with the plans are the subject of litigation, the existence of the duty is generally
recognized, 232 and the negligence standard of care is applied to determine whether
the architect was negligent in carrying out his supervisory duty.233 The duty to
supervise construction methods and techniques, however, presents a more difficult
issue.
2. Supervision of Construction Methods and Techniques
The greatest growth in claims by third parties against architects has been based
on contracts between the architect and the owner that require the architect to
supervise construction.2 34 This area is also subject to the most controversy. Con-
troversial issues are whether an architect should have a duty to supervise construction
methods and techniques and when the duty should apply.
The aspect of this duty applicable to third parties arises primarily from physical
injury caused by faulty construction or improper construction methods. Construction
workers comprise a large part of the claiming third parties, and the predominant issue
is the duty to supervise for site safety. The two relevant inquiries are, first, whether
the architect has undertaken to supervise the construction and, second, what the
promise to supervise entails.
a. Early Cases
Lottman v. Barnett235 is an early case that held an architect liable for improper
supervision of construction methods. In that case, the architect approved the use of a
jackscrew in an unsafe manner and was held liable for advising the use of an improper
226. Note, supra note 7, at 250.
227. 59 III. App. 379 (1895).
228. Id. at 380-81; see supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
229. Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159, 167 (D.R.I. 1959).
230. AIA Document B141/CM, supra note 26, § 1.5.5.
231. See Miller v. Dewitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 293, 226 N.E.2d 630, 642-43 (1967) (House. J., dissenting). The
architect disclaimed any guarantees of performance by the contractor, and the contract explicitly provided that the
contractor was responsible for the safety of employees. Id. at 280-81,226 N.E.2d at 635-36. The court found a duty of
supervision despite the disclaimers.
232. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 128-37, 203-05 (discussion of the negligence standard of care).
234. Crisham, supra note 166, at 184.
235. 62 Mo. 159 (1876).
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construction technique.2 36 Liability was based on a theory of misfeasance 237 rather
than breach of a duty to supervise construction methods. Thus, Lottnan established
the proposition that when an architect engages in positive acts of misfeasance that
endanger a third party, a duty of care arises to the injured party.238
Another area in which a duty of care relating to construction methods arises to
third parties is when an architect has prior knowledge of a hazardous condition that
eventually causes personal injury to a third party.2 39 In Swarthout v. Beard240 an
action was brought against an architect for the wrongful death of a contractor's
employee resulting from a cave-in of an excavation. 241 The court held that since the
architect had knowledge of the dangerous condition, his failure to act could constitute
negligence.- -
Lottnan and Swarthout were not typical cases of negligent supervision of
construction methods. These cases did not impose a duty to supervise construction
methods, but were based on misfeasance (Lottman) and on a failure to act despite
notice of a dangerous condition (Swarthout). Thus, these cases are distinguishable
from cases in which the architect is held to have a duty to ensure that no dangerous
condition arises.
The contract between architect and owner, which typically sets forth the
responsibilities of each of the parties,2 43 is vital in determining the architect's duty to
supervise construction methods since it is generally recognized that the architect has
no duty of supervision unless he assumes it in some manner. 244 Many cases in which
third parties (including construction workers) have brought successful suits against
architects have based liability on "provisions in the professional service contract with
the client or the general conditions in the construction contract (or both). "245
236. Id.
237. Misfeasance is defined as "'[tlhe improper performance of some act which a man may lawfully do." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 902 (5th ed. 1979). In the architectural context, misfeasance denotes an architect's improper act (e.g..
directing the use of an unsafe construction method), rather than a negligent failure to prevent the use of the unsafe
methods.
238. See Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961); Olsen v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 10 A.D.2d 539, 205 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960), affdmem., 9 N.Y.2d 829. 175 N.E.2d 350, 215 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1961);
Clemens v. Benzinger. 211 A.D. 586, 207 N.Y.S. 539 (1925).
239. See Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960); Swarthout v. Beard, 33 Mich. App. 395.
190 N.W.2d 373 (1971); see also Potter v. Gilbert. 130 A.D. 632,634. 115 N.Y.S. 425,427, affdmnemn., 196 N.Y. 576.
90 N.E. 1165 (1909).
240. 33 Mich. App. 395, 190 N.W.2d 373 (1971).
241. Id. at 398-99, 190 N.W.2d at 374.
242. Id. at 402-03. 190 N.W.2d at 376.
243. See generally the American Institute of Architects' Documents reprinted in J. LAMBERT & L. WHITE,
HANDBOOK OF MODERN CONSTRUCrION LAW at 231-347 (1982).
244. See, e.g.. Duggan v. Arnold N. May Builders, Inc., 33 Wis. 2d 49, 53, 146 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1966).
245. Types of ProfessionalLiabilirt Claims, in GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE at Special Studies-5,-5(1)
(Victor 0. Schinnerer & Co. ed. 1979); see Clinton v. Boehm, 139 A.D. 73. 124 N.Y.S. 789 (1910). Clinton was an
early case setting forth the architect's duty to supervise construction methods and techniques. The court examined the
relationship between the architect, owner, and contractor to determine whether or not the architect had assumed the duty to
supervise construction methods. Id. The court held that the architect had not assumed a duty to supervise the methods of
construction and, therefore, was not liable. Id. This case indicates the analysis of the contractual relationships that courts
undertake when considering the duty of supervision.
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The trend for courts to find that an architect has a duty to supervise construction
methods began with the view that architects have too much authority to be immune
from liability. 24 6 Pancoast v. Russel 24 7 is an early case that held an architect to a
duty to supervise construction methods. The opinion, by a California appellate court,
reflects the activist school of thought.248 The court held that "the term 'general
supervision,' as used in the instant agreement, must mean something other than mere
superficial supervision. Obviously, there can be no real value in supervision unless
the same be directed towards securing a workmanlike adherence to specifications and
adequate performance on the part of the contractor.' '249 In Pancoast the action was
by a homeowner against the architect for negligent performance of the duty to inspect
and approve the contractor's work.25" The opinion clearly demonstrates the view that
the architect's contractual obligation of "general supervision" means significantly
more than supervision for conformity with the design. Thus, this case marks the
beginning of the liberal expansion of the architect's duty.
Although the duty of supervision generally had been limited to assuring
conformity with plans and specifications, 251 many jurisdictions began to adopt
expansive views of the architect's duty.252 In Pastorelli v. Associated Engineers,
Inc.,25 3 which dealt with the duty of supervising engineers, a federal district court
held that an architect or engineer who has general supervision and control of
construction must exercise reasonable care to see that the contractors do their work
properly.254 The application of a negligence standard indicates that the court implied
a duty to supervise construction methods. This principle was made explicit in Erhart
v. Hummonds,255 an action against architects for the deaths of workmen who were
killed when the wall of an excavation caved in.256 The Supreme Court of Arkansas
expressly held that the architects had a duty to supervise construction methods. 257
The duty, reasoned the court, arose from the general supervisory responsibilities of
architects coupled with the architect's contractual authority to stop work to ensure
"'proper execution of the contract.' -258 This theme is common among early cases
finding a duty to supervise construction methods. 259
246. Allen, supra note 1, at 460.
247. 148 Cal. App. 2d 909, 307 P.2d 719 (1957).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 194-99 (discussion of the "active" architectural role).
249. 148 Cal. App. 2d 909, 913, 307 P.2d 719, 722-23 (1957).
250. Id. at 910-11, 307 P.2d at 721.
251. See Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961); wells v. Stanley J. Thill &
Assocs., 153 Mont. 28, 452 P.2d 1015 (1969); Olsen v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 10 A.D.2d 539, 205 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1960), aff'd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 829, 175 N.E.2d 350, 215 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1961).
252. See Associated Eng'rs, Inc. v. Job, 370 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1966); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 325 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1963); Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., 176 F. Supp.
159 (D.R.I. 1959) (supervising engineer); Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960); Larson v.
Commonwealth Edison Co.. 33 Ill. 2d 316. 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs., 19 Utah
2d 101, 426 P.2d 621 (1967).
253. 176 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1959).
254. Id. at 166.
255. 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960). Contra Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d
660 (1961).
256. 232 Ark. 133, 135-36, 334 S.W.2d 869, 871 (1960).
257. Id. at 138, 334 S.W.2d at 872.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 252.
[Vol. 45:217
ARCHITECTURAL LIABILITY
While Erhart established the existence of a duty to supervise construction
methods, Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp.26° limited the architect's duty to that
of reasonably ensuring conformity with the plans and specifications. In Erhart the
architect had an express right to stop work to assure proper execution of the
contract.2 6 1 In Day, however, the contract gave the architect no express authority to
stop work, although this authority could have been implied from the architect's
responsibility to assure conformity with the design.2 62 Thus, the presence of a
contractual right to stop work played an important role in the expansion of the
supervisory duty.
b. The Miller Doctrine
The right to stop work also played a key role in Miller v. DeWitt.2 63 Miller was a
landmark decision and the culmination of the cases establishing the duty to supervise
construction methods. 264 In Miller a contractor's employees, who had been injured
when the roof on a building they were renovating collapsed, 265 alleged that the
architect's failure to prevent the contractor from improperly shoring the roof con-
stituted negligence. 266 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the architect had a
duty to supervise construction methods and techniques, basing the existence of this
duty on the contract between the architect and the owner.
267
The contract provided that the architect's duties included "'general supervision
and direction of the work,'" and the contract gave the architect "'authority to stop
the work whenever such stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper execution of
the contract.' -268 The contract provided that the contractor was responsible for site
safety 269 and that the architect did not guarantee the work of the contractor. 270 The
court noted that generally the duty of an architect to supervise merely creates a duty to
see that the building meets the plans and specifications, 27 1 but imposed a greater
duty, one that was not expressly part of the contract between the owner and architect.
The court considered both the owner-architect and owner-contractor agreements, and
interpreted the sum of the agreements to impose on the architect the duty to interfere
or even stop work if the contractor began to act in an unsafe manner or to use a
hazardous method in violation of the contractor's agreement with the owner.2 72 Thus,
260. 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961). In Day a workman sued the architect for injuries sustained when a boiler
exploded during installation and testing in the building designed by the architect. The court held that supervision of
installation and testing methods was outside the architect's realm of authority. See also Olsen v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
10 A.D.2d 539, 205 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960), affd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 829, 175 N.E.2d 350, 215 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1961).
261. 232 Ark. 133, 138, 334 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1960).
262. See 241 La. 288, 303-05, 128 So. 2d 660. 666-67 (1961).
263. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 252-62.
265. 37 I11. 2d 273, 275, 226 N.E.2d 630, 633 (1967).
266. Id. at 285, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
267. Id. at 284-85, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
268. Id. at 284, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
269. Id. at 281, 226 N.E.2d at 636.
270. Id. at 280, 226 N.E.2d at 635.
271. Id. at 284. 226 N.E.2d at 638.
272. Id.
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the court imposed on the architect a duty of ensuring that the contractor did not
violate the owner-contractor agreement and that safe and adequate construction
methods were used2 73 -an expansion of duty that neither party intended.
Justice House, dissenting in Miller, argued that the contract did not impose such
a duty, but provided only for limited supervision,2 74 noting that in the contract the
architect agreed to attempt to prevent defects, but specifically disclaimed any
guarantee of the contractor's performance. 275 Justice House acknowledged that the
architect had a right to insist upon the safe and adequate use of construction methods,
but argued that to transform the right into a duty was inconsistent with common usage
and with the contract itself.2 76 An architect, according to Justice House, does not
normally contract for continuous supervision, but if the duty to supervise construction
methods is expanded, the architect will reflect the increased responsibility through an
increase in fees, a cost that will ultimately be borne by the public. 277 Finally, Justice
House argued that an owner does not want such a duty imposed since it would result
in chaos at the work site, with architects stopping work regularly-a result that is
inefficient and costly to the owner.
278
The effect of Miller is unclear. One writer considers the decision significant
because it based the architect's duty to supervise construction methods solely upon
the contract between the owner andthe architect.2 79 This view is not accurate. The
court in Miller looked at all the agreements, including the owner-contractor agree-
ment. More important, the case is significant because it extended the architect's
liability beyond that contemplated in the owner-architect agreement and, apparently,
beyond the intent of the parties.
280
Miller is inconsistent with the view that methods of construction are within the
realm of the contractor's authority and control rather than the architect's. 281 It is also
inconsistent with the view that contractors may be better able to control construction
methods than architects, whose primary responsibility is design. 282 These in-
consistencies have led some to believe that the courts have created a duty that
"[requires] more than conduct reasonably to be expected of a prudent design pro-
fessional and amounts, in effect, to liability without proof of negligence-strict
liability."283
273. Id.
274. Id. at 293, 226 N.E.2d at 642 (House, J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. id. at 293-94. 226 N.E.2d at 643.
277. Id. at 295, 226 N.E.2d at 643. While there will be an increased cost no matter who bears the burden, deciding
which party will bear the burden is important and can have significant ramifications. See infra text accompanying notes
340-44. 444-48 for a discussion of the architect's ability to allocate these costs and an argument indicating that costs to
the public need not necessarily increase.
278. 37 111. 2d 273, 294, 226 N.E.2d 630, 643 (1967) (House. J., dissenting).
279. Note, supra note 7, at 252.
280. Carey, Assessing Liability of Architects and Engineers for Construction Supervision, 672 INs. L.J. 147, 154
(1979).
281. See Note, supra note 7, at 250.
282. Interview with practicing engineer, Dayton, Ohio (December 28, 1982).
283. Note, supra note 16, at 1243; see also infra text subpart IV(A) (discussion of the strict liability theory).
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The Miller decision has not been overruled, but a later Illinois case has dis-
tinguished Miller, finding that an architect did not have a duty to supervise construc-
tion methods. 28 4 In McGovern v. Standish2 85 an injured employee of the contractor
brought an action against the architect. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
architect was not liable to the worker because the architect did not have the right to
control or direct methods of construction. 286 The contract terms were similar to those
in Miller, except that the architect did not have an express right to stop work.2 87 In
McGovern, the court found that the architect did have the right to reject defective
materials and require their correction, but did not have the right to stop work because
it was being done in a dangerous manner.288
Although McGovern apparently held that no duty to supervise construction
methods exists without a contractual right to stop work, the court did indicate some
exceptions. The opinion implies that the existence of expansive authority vested with
the architect may create a duty to workers and, further, that attempts to exercise
control over the work by issuing orders or directions may create such a duty.289
Therefore, this decision does not establish nonliability based on carefully worded
contracts. Instead, the opinion reflects the court's determination that in the circum-
stances of the McGovern case the architect did not have sufficient control to warrant
imposing a duty, but that an architect could have such control even absent a right to
stop work. Thus, strategic use of contract language may not protect the architect if the
judiciary determines that liability should be extended.
The Miller decision is not an isolated case. In Geer v. Bennett290 a Florida
appellate court held that an architect may be liable for his failure to direct the
contractor to install a guardrail to prevent persons from falling from a twelve-foot
high construction area. The plaintiff was injured in a fall from the construction
area. 29' The court based the duty to supervise construction methods on the duty of
"supervision" specified in the contract, although the contract did not give the
architect the right to stop work.2 9 2 The decision is a simple expansion of the duty
established by the word "supervision," an analysis that holds an architect to a duty
that neither party intended.
The expansion of duty has not been accepted by all courts. In Reber v. Chandler
High School District No. 202293 an Arizona appellate court expressly rejected the
Miller doctrine.294 Reber was an action by the contractor's employees against an
owner and his architect for injuries sustained when a gymnasium under construction
284. McGovern v. Standish, 65 Ill. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142.
287. Id. at 63-65, 357 N.E.2d at 1139-40; see supra text accompanying notes 268-70.
288. 65 III. 2d 54, 68, 357 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (1976).
289. Id. at 68-69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142.
290. 237 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
291. Id. at 313.
292. Id. at 313-14.
293. 13 Ariz. App. 133, 474 P.2d 852 (1970).
294. Id. at 135-36, 474 P.2d at 854-55; see supra text accompanying notes 263-73.
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collapsed. 295 The court held that the owner-contractor agreement can be used to settle
ambiguities in the owner-architect agreement if the architect provided both
agreements, 296 but found that the contracts did not provide for the architect to ex-
ercise control over the method and manner of performing the details of the work.
29 7
While the contract in Reber did not include the right to stop work, the court rejected
the argument from Miller that such a right gives rise to a corresponding duty. 29 8 The
court held that "liability for negligent exercise of retained supervisory powers can
attach only when there is a showing that a duty has been created by the [architect's]
reservation of. . . 'the right to exercise day-by-day control over the manner in
which the details of the work are performed.' "299
The absence of a right to stop work is apparently not the basis of the decision
since the court expressly rejected Miller and adopted the view of the Miller dis-
sent. 300 Neither the contract in Reber nor that found in Geer3° 1 contained a right to
stop work, yet the results of the two cases were different, presumably because, in
Reber, the court determined that the duty should not be extended unless expressly
assumed and undertaken by the architect.
30 2
The doctrine established by Miller3°3 still has viability, and architects have been
held to a duty of supervision of construction methods in cases subsequent to
Miller.3 4 The trend established in Miller still appears predominant, but a movement
has occurred away from the extensive duty of supervision set forth in Miller back to a
consideration of the agreements on a more objective level. 305 Recent decisions in
some jurisdictions have adopted a less expansive view of the architect's duty to
supervise. It is well recognized that the contract relationships between architect,
owner, and contractor play an important role in determining whether an architect has
295. 13 Ariz. App. 133, 134, 474 P.2d 852, 853-54 (1970).
296. Id. at 136, 474 P.2d at 855.
297. Id. at 137, 474 P.2d at 856.
298. Id. at 135-36, 474 P.2d at 854-55.
299. Id. at 135, 474 P.2d at 854 (emphasis in original).
300. Id. at 135-36, 474 P.2d at 854-55 (citing Miller v. Dewitt, 37 I11. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967)). The
dissenters in Miller believed that the contract required only limited supervision and that the contract should be interpreted
to fulfill the intent of the parties. Justice House indicated that extensive supervisory powers should be based on clear
enumeration of them in the contract and that in the typical contract, supervision only includes ensuring substantial
conformity of the structure to the owner's requirements. 37 111. 2d 273,293-95,226 N.E.2d 630. 642-43 (1967) (House,
J., dissenting).
301. See supra notes 292-98 and accompanying text.
302. 13 Ariz. App. 133, 135, 474 P.2d 852, 854 (1970).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 263-73.
304. See, e.g.. Duncan v. Pennington County Hous. Auth., 283 N.W.2d 546, 548-49 (S.D. 1979) (architect liable
for site safety based on architect's contractual requirement of "obtainling] compliance with the contract documents"
through on-site inspections).
305. See McGovem v. Standish, 65 II1. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976). However, the court still relied on the
overall circumstances and a review of the architect's role and authority rather than relying strictly on the agreement.
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a duty to supervise construction methods for the protection of third parties. The intent
of the parties is also recognized as an important consideration. 316 Some recent cases
have taken a narrow view of the contract so that it is interpreted to strictly conform to
the intent of the parties.
30 7
C. Architects' Attempts to Limit the Liability Arising from Supervision of
Construction Methods.
Architects have responded to decisions such as Miller and Geer by attempting to
limit their liability through changes in contract language. The current owner-architect
contract form of the American Institute of Architects does not use the word
"supervision."- 30 ' The form provides only for visits to the site, at intervals to be
determined by the architect, to verify that the work is proceeding according to the
contract. 30 9 It also contains an express disclaimer providing that the architect is not
responsible for construction methods, techniques, or safety precautions. 3 1 0 The con-
tract also has omitted the "right to stop work," and retained only a right to reject
work that does not conform to the contract documents.
3 1
'
The effectiveness of these changes is uncertain. Architects have eliminated the
word "supervision" from the contracts because they believe that it is too broad to
describe architects' duties and it allows courts to hold architects responsible for many
aspects of the construction process for which the architects did not intend to assume
responsibility. 3 2 The deletion of the word "supervision," however, may not make a
substantial difference. Since architects still perform the same functions despite the
reworded definition, a court, consistent with Miller,313 may look beyond the lan-
guage and impose a duty of supervision of construction methods on the architect.
3 14
Similarly, the deletion of the "right to stop work" may not have the desired effect
306. See Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 195 Colo. 291, 577 P.2d 1092 (1978) (intent is critical determination); Porter
v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1974) (right to inspect work for conformity with plans and right to
stop work if provisions of contract are not carried out does not constitute retention of control sufficient to hold inspection
engineer liable to contractor's employees); Duggan v. Arnold N. May Builders. Inc., 33 Wis. 2d 49, 146 N.W.2d 410
(1966) (architect held to no supervisory duty at all).
307. Wheeler& Lewis v. Slifer, 195 Colo. 291,577 P.2d 1092 (1978); Fruzyna v. Walter C. Carlson Assocs., Inc.,
78 111. App. 3d 1050, 398 N.E.2d 60 (1979); Krieger v. J.E. Greiner Co., 282 Md. 50, 382 A.2d 1069 (1978);
Moundsview Indep. School Dist. No. 621 v. Buetow & Assocs., Inc.. 253 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1977); Brown v. Gamble
Constr. Co., 537 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Porter v. Stevens, Thompson & Runyan, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 624,
602 P.2d 1192 (1979); Luterbach v. Mochon, Schutte, Hackworthy, Juerison, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 1,267 N.W.2d 13 (1978);
Vonasek v. Hirsch & Stevens, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d 1. 221 N.W.2d 815 (1974).
308. AIA Document BI41/CM, supra note 26.
309. Id. § 1.5.4.
310. Id. § 1.5.5.
311. Id. § 1.5.12.
312. Types of Professional Liability Claims, supra note 245, at Special Studies-5(3).
313. 37 III. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); see supra text accompanying notes 263-73.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 279-80, 288-89; see also Miller v. DeWitt, 37 I11. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630
(1967); McGovern v. Standish, 65 I11. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976). But see Reber v. Chandler High School Dist. No.
202, 13 Ariz. App. 133, 474 P.2d 852 (1970).
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since the architect still retains the same functions at the work site, and the power to
"reject work' '3 5 may be interpreted to be substantially equivalent to the power to
stop work. Last, the express disclaimers in the current form contracts 31 6 are similar to
provisions in earlier contracts, provisions that the courts have given little or no
effect.
3 17
If, as the cases indicate, the courts base the duty of supervision on the role of the
architect and the control that he has, 3 18 the change in contract language will have
little effect. The outcome will instead depend on the architect's control and the
willingness of a court to expand the architect's liability. Given the traditional role of
the architect in the construction process, it may be very easy for a court to determine
that an architect had sufficient authority and control to justify imposing a duty to
supervise construction methods, techniques, and site safety. Architects must be
aware of this expansive view of their roles and responsibilities. Architects must also
be aware of other theories that impose liability to third parties on them.
IV. OTHER THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A. Strict Liability
As noted earlier, strict liability was the rule applied to architects in the early
Babylonian and Roman civilizations. 31 9 A strict liability theory does not require
negligence, but does require an act or omission, an injury, and a proximate cause
relationship between the act and the injury. 320 Strict liability theory is most com-
monly applied in suits such as those against mass manufacturers because of the
problems the injured plaintiff would encounter in attempting to prove a negligent
act. 32 ' It is difficult, if not impossible, for an injured consumer to trace back through
the channel of trade to the source of production and then discover the origin of the
defect.3 2 Moreover, the disparity in position and bargaining power between the
manufacturer and the consumer forces the consumer to depend entirely on the manu-
facturer for a safe product.323
The general rule today, however, is that strict liability is not applicable to
persons providing professional services. 324 Ordinarily, strict liability is not applied to
315. AIA Document B141/CM. supra note 26, § 1.5.12.
316. Id. §,1.5.5.
317. See, e.g., Miller v. DeWitt, 37 III. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). Miller dealt with a contract with a
disclaimer similar to those currently used, but the court apparently refused to give the disclaimer any effect. See supra text
accompanying notes 269-75.
318. See. e.g.. Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 111. 2d 273, 226
N.E.2d 630 (1967); McGovern v. Standish, 65 Il1. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976); see also supra text accompanying
notes 263-92.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
320. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9. § 75, at 494-95.
321. La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 942-43 (contractor); K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group, Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 813, 816 (D. Conn.
1980) (strict liability not applicable to architect for defective design); Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs.,
Eng'rs, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 856, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972) (engineers); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 III. App.
2d 153, 162, 222 N.E.2d 584. 589 (1966) (engineers who provided architectural designs).
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architects because negligence can be proved. 325 In the recent case of K-Mart Corp. v.
Midcon Realty Group, Ltd.3 2 6 a merchant asserted a strict liability theory against the
architect who had designed the store the merchant occupied because the roof of the
store had collapsed. 327 The federal district court held, first, that the strict liability
theory is not applicable to professional services328 and, second, that assuming
arguendo that the designs were "products" sold by the architect, the merchant did
not use the products in the condition in which they were sold-he used the build-
ing, not the plans. 329 The court noted that strict liability theory was intended to apply
to "those who market defective products to the general public in a mass-distribution
context.'"330 The court also recognized, however, that the doctrine of strict liability
could apply to "the design and development of buildings which, like ordinary &n-
sumer products, are mass marketed to the public."-
33 1
Despite the majority rule against application of strict liability to professional
services, at least two jurisdictions have applied strict liability to design pro-
fessionals. 332 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. 3 3 3 is the leading case imposing strict
liability on a design professional. This case dealt with a designer of mass-produced
homes who was also the developer and builder. 334 The court held that the designer
could be held liable under a strict liability theory for injuries to a child caused by the
defective design of a home, 335 analogizing the defendant designer to a mass-
production manufacturer. 336 Schipper appears to have little applicability to the other
architect liability cases because it was based on the mass production of the homes and
the complete role played by the defendant as designer, developer, and builder. In
general, the rule remains that strict liability is not applicable to architectural
services.
337
In determining whether strict liability may or should be applied to design pro-
fessionals, an examination of the policy arguments justifying its application to man-
ufacturers is critical. The first justification is the difficult burden of proof that a
consumer of mass-produced items would bear in a negligence action. It may be
impossible for such a consumer to trace a defective item back through the distribution
325. La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968).
326. 489 F. Supp. 813 (D. Conn. 1980).
327. Id. at 814. The architect had sold the designs to the builder, Midcon Realty.
328. Id. at 816.
329. Id. at 817. This requirement of using the "product" in the condition in which it was sold is an element of strict
liability theory as applied to the sale of goods. Id.
330. Id. at 818.
331. Id.
332. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64
S.E.2d 885 (1951). The Supreme Court of South Carolina imposed a warranty on the designer of a frozen-food locker
facility, applying the theory that furnishing plans for a contractor warrants that the plans are sufficient. Imposition of the
warranty amounted to the application of a strict liability theory.
333. 44 N.J. 70. 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
334. Id, at 80. 207 A.2d at 320.
335. Id. at 96, 207 A.2d at 328.
336. Id. at 90-91, 207 A.2d at 325.
337. See supra note 324.
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and production systems of a manufacturer. 338 This justification is clearly inapplicable
when one-of-a-kind projects are at issue and the alleged defect is in the design of a
single product rather than a mass-produced product. 339 In such design cases, an
injured party knows where to go to find a defect and is not presented with a long and
technical process to trace production back to its early stages. Therefore, application
of strict liability to architects is not justified on the basis of an onerous burden of
proof.
The second policy argument for applying strict liability to manufacturers is that
the economic burden on the injured party may be immense and cannot be allocated to
others, while the manufacturers are capable of allocating the risk of loss since they
can pass the cost on to the customers who benefit from the product.340 This argument
appears to apply to architects, and one commentator argues that the design pro-
fessional is the most capable of bearing the loss by passing the cost on to his
customers, 34 ' but the owner is actually more capable than the architect. The owner
created the demand for the construction and can pass the cost directly on to the
"ultimate risk-creator"-the owner's customers.3 42 If the architect passes the cost on
to his small client base of owners, the owners presumably will pass this cost on to
their customers. Thus, the ultimate result is the same.
The method by which this result occurs, however, has different effects on the
parties. If the cost is placed on an owner, then he by necessity will pass this cost on to
his customers. The danger in this direct passing of the cost is that the customers will
be inhibited in their consumption of the product (the structure). The effect, however,
is more damaging when the architect attempts to pass on this cost. The cost to the
architect is the cost of liability insurance, 343 and the architect will attempt to transfer
this cost to the owner. The owner, however, may not be willing to accept it. Instead,
the owner may seek an architect with a lower fee. Another architect may be able to
lower his fee by "going bare" (i.e., practicing without liability insurance). 3 ' There-
fore, the architect who increases his fees when his responsibilities are increased may
be undercut by the architect who reduces his costs by practicing without insurance or
with only limited protection.
The architect is thus faced with two alternatives, either of which could be
economically disastrous. First, he could assume the new responsibilities without
increasing his fees, but this could cause such losses that the architect could not
continue in business. Second, he could raise fees, but if he is underbid by other
architects who could maintain lower costs by carrying less liability insurance, the
338. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J.. concurring).
339. Note, supra note 16, at 1244.
340. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor. J., concurring):
see Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965); see also Note, supra note 16. at 1244.
341. Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1361,
1379-91 (1967).
342. Note, supra note 16, at 1245.
343. See infra text accompanying notes 444-45.
344. See Berreby, Architects: After the Fall, Nat'l L.J., July 19, 1982, at I. 31, col. 4.
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result would be disastrous. One result of increasing fees is that some customers would
choose to forego the expense. For the owner with a broad client base, the loss of a
few customers may not be a problem, but if an architect with a small client base loses
even one customer, he could be losing a significant percentage of his business.
The third policy argument for strict liability is one of deterrence. A manufacturer
has an interest in avoiding monetary loss and the loss of good will through damage
claims. Therefore, the threat of civil suits with no requirement of fault serves as an
inducement for the manufacturer to take precautions to minimize injuries to
customers. 34 5 This policy appears valid for architects, but the effectiveness of the
deterrent will depend on the extent of the architect's control. If strict liability is to
serve as a deterrent to negligence at the construction level, it should be imposed on
the party who is in the best position to control and prevent the creation of unnecessary
risks of harm to third parties. While the architect does possess some technical skills
appropriate to the construction process, the contractor, by virtue of his position in the
construction process, is better able to effectively prevent errors at the construction
level. The contractor is concerned primarily with construction, while the architect is
concerned primarily with design and only secondarily with construction. Thus, the
architect is a poor choice for controlling the construction process.
346
Once a project is completed, the owner is in a better position than the architect to
discover and correct defects. Although the architect has the skills to discover defects,
he is no longer associated with the structure. To hold that the architect has sufficient
control to serve as an effective target for deterrence would be to assume that an
architect routinely inspects all his structures after completion, an assumption that is
both inaccurate and unreasonable. The owner also has control over the economic
elements such as financing. These economic considerations often lead to improper
construction and other problems.3 47
The imposition of strict liability on architects may seem appropriate for deterring
the production of structures that are dangerous or unsuited for their intended pur-
poses. This view, however, ignores the distinctions between the manufacturing pro-
cess and the construction process. 348 Quality control on a construction project is more
difficult than on a production line for two reasons. First, a manufacturer has physical
control of a usually repetitive production process. Construction projects, however,
are unique situations with no opportunity to develop control tests within the process.
Second, a manufaturer can control the human element of production in a relatively
345. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
346. Design professionals, however, have been held liable for negligence in connection with construction. See
generaIly supra text accompanying notes 234-307.
347. An example of the exercise of economic control is the decision to use the " 'fast track' method, a fairly
common procedure in which construction proceeds before all drawings are complete." Wall St. J.. Oct. 8. 1982. at 16,
col. I (article discussing the collapse of the skywalks at the Hyatt Regency in Kansas City). The owner, who has economic
control, will be the one to make the decision to use a "fast track" method, which may result in improper construction.
348. Note, supra note 16, at 1247.
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permanent and fixed environment, but the architect must deal with numerous sub-
contractors and construction workers with whom he may never have worked be-
fore. 3 4 9 Thus, the architect clearly lacks control over the human element of produc-
tion.
The role of the architect as a designer provides him with considerable control
over the preparation of the plans and specifications, but his control during the con-
struction phase is not sufficient to make him an appropriate target for deterring
construction defects. Thus, a deterrence policy does not justify imposing strict liabil-
ity on architects.
Application of a strict liability theory to an architect's designs would require that
the architect produce a perfect set of plans. By the very nature of the profession, this
requirement would be unreasonable. An architect is operating in areas of uncertainty,
with a premium placed on creativity. To demand creativity and perfection from the
architect is to require a standard that cannot realistically be achieved.
The doctrine of strict liability is not appropriate for architects, and the general
rule of nonapplicability is correct. 350 While exceptions to the majority rule exist, 35'
the cases indicate that the exceptions are based largely on particular facts and cir-
cumstances, and architects generally are not held liable under a traditional strict
liability theory.
B. Breach of Warranty
Warranty theory has limited application to third parties since most warranty
claims rely on implied warranties by the architect to the owner. 352 When defective
products have been at issue, manufacturers often have been held liable for a breach of
an implied warranty, 353 but the courts are generally hesitant to hold an architect liable
for breach of an implied warranty. 354 The general rule is that the architect is not a
warrantor or guarantor. 355 An exception to this general rule is the holding of a
minority of courts that a design professional, by undertaking to furnish plans and
specifications, warrants their sufficiency for the intended purpose. 35 6 Such a war-
ranty, however, is not a warranty of no defects. Another exception arises from cases
in which an architect has expressly warranted his plans and work.
35 7
349. Id.
350. For a discussion of the inapplicability of strict liability to service professions based on the RESTATIz.%ENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964), see Comment, supra note 13, at 81.
351. See supra note 332.
352. See, e.g., Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963).
353. See. e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
354. See Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs., Inc., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Ryan v. Morgan Spear Assocs., Inc., 546 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
355. See Bayne v. Everham, 197 Mich. 181. 199-200, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (1917); Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v.
Sordoni Constr. Co., 401 Pa. 358, 361-62, 164 A.2d 201, 203 (1960).
356. Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co.. 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963); Hill v. Polar Pantries. 219 S.C. 263. 64
S.E.2d 885 (1951); Niver v. Nash, 7 Wash. 558, 35 P. 380 (1893).
357. See Smallwood v. Pettit-Galloway Co., 187 Ark. 379,59 S.W.2d 1031 (1933); City of McPherson v. Stucker.
122 Kan. 595, 256 P. 963 (1927); Gould v. McCormick, 75 Wash. 61, 134 P. 676 (1913).
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A Florida appellate court in Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E.
Britt Associates, Inc.,358 clearly stated the majority rule, holding that a design pro-
fessional "does not 'warrant' his services ... to be 'merchantable' or 'fit for an
intended use.' ,,35 Such terms, said the court, are applicable only to goods. 36' The
design professional only "'warrants' that he will or has exercised his skill according
to a certain standard of care, that he acted reasonably and without neglect.''361 In
Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers,362 a California appel-
late court affirmed this view. The court held that "where the primary objective of a
transaction is to obtain services, the doctrines of implied warranty and strict liability
do not apply.' '363 Relying on the reasonable expectations of the parties, the court
continued, "'[t]hose who hire [design professionals] are not justified in expecting
infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase
service, not insurance.' 364
Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co.365 more specifically set forth a basis for
refusing to hold architects as guarantors. The Supreme Court of Alabama gave a
detailed description of the architect's function that demonstrates the complexities and
uncertainties involved.3 66 An architect must satisfy the practical and aesthetic re-
quirements of a structure, while dealing in experimental and uncertain situations.367
Architects deal with uncertainties and make judgments based on less than perfect
information. They have no clear answers and no clearly established guidelines. Given
the state of the architect's practice, it would be inequitable to hold architects to a
theory of implied warranty, and the courts apparently accept this view.
3 6 8
C. Negligence Per Se
Many suits against architects contain an allegation that the architect failed to
adhere to the mandate of a building code governing the project. 3 6 9 This allegation
raises the issue of whether the standard of care imposed on the architect requires
358. 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
359. Id. at 335.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972).
363. Id. at 855, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
364. Id. at 855-56, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting Gagne v. Bertran. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489-90. 275 P.2d 15, 21
(1954)).
365. 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963).
366. Id. at 39-40, 151 So. 2d at 771-72.
367. See supra text accompanying note 149 for the complete statement by the court.
368. See. e.g.. Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs.. Eng'rs. 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259
(1972); Audlane Lumber& Builders Supply. Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs.. Inc.. 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964):
Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 I1. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966); Ryan v. Morgan Spear Assocs., Inc., 546
SW.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
369. Akin, Negligence Per Se: Architects and Engheers-Beware!, in GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING PRACricE at
General Information-10 (Victor 0. Schinnerer & Co. ed. 1972).
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compliance with building codes. Some cases have apparently held that it does and
that the pertinent statute may require a standard higher than the common-law negli-
gence standard. 37
0
Failure to satisfy the statute may be negligence per se-negligence as a matter of
law. Negligence per se is the breach of a duty imposed by a statute and constitutes
negligence without reference to the degree of care exercised or the foreseeability of
the injury. 3 7 1 Negligence per se is similar to the strict liability theory in that both
impose liability without common-law negligence. The difference is that under strict
liability a party is held liable based on the fact of an injury, while under negligence
per se, liability is based on the failure to satisfy a statutory duty.
Although negligence per se is a critical theory in an architect's susceptibility to
liability, it is subject to some limitations. The violation of a statute alone is not
sufficient to constitute negligence per se. To prove an allegation of negligence per se,
the plaintiff must show (1) that a violation of the statute or building code has oc-
curred, (2) that the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute or code was
designed to protect, (3) that the injury is one the statute or code was designed to
prevent, and (4) that the injury was proximately caused by the statutory violation. 372
The most difficult element for the plaintiff to prove in a claim of negligence per se is
the element of proximate cause.
Another important question relating to negligence per se is whether compliance
with a statute or building code is sufficient to meet the negligence standard of care as
a matter of law. A Missouri case, Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 3 7 3 held that
compliance with a statutory standard may satisfy the negligence standard as a matter
of law. Unless the statute clearly establishes an absolute duty, however, the statute
may be viewed as only a minimum standard under which compliance alone may not
be sufficient to satisfy the negligence standard of care. 374 The question is one of
interpretation of whether the statute was intended to establish a minimum or an
absolute duty. Speculation on statutory intent can be dangerous, and one should not
assume that compliance will satisfy a negligence standard. The architect should
maintain the ordinary and necessary standard of care and also be sure to comply with
all applicable statutes and codes.
Even absent a finding of negligence per se from the failure to satisfy a statutory
requirement, the architect should be aware that juries may be instructed that failure to
satisfy a statute can be considered in determining whether the architect satisfied the
common-law negligence standard of care. 37 5 A jury may believe that, given the
370. See Burran v. Dambold, 422 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Salem Title Co.. 246 Or. 409, 425 P.2d
519 (1967).
371. Akin, supra note 369, at General Information-10(I).
372. See Sayers v. Haushalter, 493 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); W. PROSSER, supra note 9. § 36.
373. 115 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). afd, 144 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1940).
374. See id. at 223; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 36, at 201-02.
375. Davidson, supra note 135, at 22.
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failure of an architect to satisfy a statutory duty, the architect has not exercised
reasonable professional care. 37 6 Therefore, architects should remember that a viola-
tion of a statutory duty may be regarded as evidence of a negligent failure to meet the
professional standard of care, even when it is not conclusive on the issue.
D. Punitive Damages
Although damages are not a legal theory of liability, they bear consideration in a
discussion of an architect's liability to third parties since the effects of allowing
punitive damages can be devastating to architects.
The general purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter
similar actions in the future.377 A criminal act frequently will support an award of
punitive damages. 378 In addition, several other types of conduct, such as intentional
acts, gross negligence, and other acts that constitute more than mere negligence, may
support punitive damage awards. 379 The general rules on punitive damages are so
flexible that any court could hold an architect liable for punitive damages "under the
right circumstances."-
380
At present no decisions have assessed punitive damages against an architect, but
three questions remain unanswered. First, will the architect be exposed to punitive
damages in the future? Second, under what circumstances might an architect be
exposed to punitive damages? Third, to what extent would these punitive damages be
insurable?
Other professionals, such as physicians, have already been subjected to punitive
damage awards. 381 Medical cases can be distinguished from suits against architects,
however, because of the close personal relationship between physicians and patients,
a relationship that clearly does not exist between architects and third parties.
The clearest danger of punitive damages arises when an architect commits a
criminal error or omission. 382 This danger demonstrates the importance of being
aware of statutory requirements since some may impose criminal status. 3 8 3 Punitive
damages also may be applied when an architect is held to have knowingly done
something contrary to good practice or in violation of a noncriminal building code.
Such a case would arise if an architect knew of a defect, but chose to ignore it because
it was expedient to do so, or if an architect knowingly cut comers to save money,
thereby building an unsafe structure.
376. Id.
377. 3 PERSONAL INJURY § 2.02 (L. Frumer, R. Benoit, & M. Friedman ed. 1965).
378. See, e.g., Watkins v. Layton, 182 Kan. 702, 707, 324 P.2d 130, 135 (1958).
379. 25 C.I.S. Damages § 123(1) (1966).
380. Kaskell, AlE Exposure to Punitive Damages-Assessment and Insurabiity, in GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING
PRACTICE at Special Studis-7,-7(l) (Victor 0. Schinnerer & Co. ed. 1981).
381. See Wilson N. Jones Memorial Hosp. v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
382. One example would be if an architect were so grossly negligent that he could be charged with general homicide.
This would be analogous to a criminal charge for gross negligence in driving an automobile. Another example would be if
an architect acted with such knowing disregard for a third party's safety that a criminal charge could be supported and,
consequently, a request for punitive damages could be granted. See Kaskell. supra note 380, at Special Studies--7(2).
383. Id.
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Failure to realize the potential applicability of punitive damages could spell
economic disaster for an architect, particularly in light of the uncertain status of the
insurability of these damages. Some liability insurance policies provide coverage
only for liability based on the ground of negligence. 38 4 To the extent that insurance
carriers can phrase the policy to exclude intentional acts, damages for these acts will
be excluded from coverage. 385 Even if a policy covers punitive damages, the courts
may not uphold the coverage for public policy reasons.3 86 Some states, however, do
not permit insurance carriers to exclude coverage for punitive damages.
387
Clearly, punitive damages could easily be applied to an architect, and because
the ability to insure against these damages is uncertain, an architect could be sub-
jected to great economic hardship. The result is that architects must pay close atten-
tion to statutory requirements and do their utmost to exercise the reasonable pro-
fessional standard of care. The architect must also avoid excessive risks that may later
be classified as basic or knowing breaches of his duty to third parties, breaches that
may result in punitive damages.
V. THE ARCHITECT'S DEFENSES
The architect is subject to liability to third parties from a variety of sources, and
that liability has been expanding as courts seek to provide recovery for injured
parties. While the legal position of the architect appears, at best, to be uncertain and
offers a less than bright prospect for the future, the architect is not without protection.
Although the defenses of privity of contract 388 and owner acceptance 389 have been
effectively abolished, some defenses are still available. One of the most important of
the architect's shields is a special statute of limitations, which was discussed
earlier, 39' but this is not the exclusive source of shelter for the architect.
A. Basic Negligence Defenses
The most common allegation against the architect is that of negligence. This
may be a claim of negligent preparation of plans and specifications, 39 1 or an allega-
tion of a negligently exercised duty of supervision. 392 Whenever an architect is sued
on a negligence theory, his most obvious defense is to deny the existence of one of
the four negligence elements393-duty, breach, proximate cause, or damage. 394 The
injured party who alleged the negligence has the burden of proving the existence of
these four elements.
384. Id. at Special Studies-7(3).
385. Id.
386. See American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1967) (court stated that insuring against punitive
damages would violate the public policy of the state).
387. Kaskell, supra note 380, at Special Studies-7(3).
388. See supra subpart II(A).
389. See supra subpart II(B).
390. See supra text accompanying notes 86-106.
391. See supra subpart Ill(B).
392. See supra subpart Il1(C).
393. See supra subpart Ill(A).
394. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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The proximate cause element of negligence theory is probably the most difficult
for the plaintiff to prove. If the plaintiff cannot establish a sufficient causal connec-
tion between the alleged negligent act or omission and the injury sustained, the
architect will not be held liable. 395 Moreover, proximate cause requires a causal
connection that is more than just ultimate causation. The court must make a de-
termination of whether the causal relationship is sufficient to attach liability, a deci-
sion that is based on the balancing of policy considerations. Some considerations are
the moral blame of the architect's actions, the prevention of future harm, the social
impact of imposing liability, the burden on the architect and the architectural profes-
sion, and the architect's ability to bear the loss. 3 9 6 These policy considerations are
similar to those applied in the foreseeability test of duty, and the questions of
foreseeability and proximate cause often merge into a single balancing process.
In defense, the architect can claim that the alleged negligence was not the
proximate cause of the injury. The architect may allege, after a structure is com-
pleted, that the owner's negligent maintenance was the proximate cause of the injury
and that his own negligence was only remotely related to the injury sustained by the
plaintiff. Such a claim would be particularly applicable when the owner had found a
defect in the structure, but failed to remedy it. In this situation, the architect has a
persuasive argument that it was the owner's negligent failure to maintain and repair
the structure that was the proximate cause of the third party's injuries even though the
architect's actions may also have been a cause of the injuries. The absence of proxi-
mate cause may result in a finding of nonliability despite a breach of duty by the
architect.397
B. Contributory Negligence
The defense of contributory negligence is often raised in personal injury suits
brought by third parties against architects. 398 In some jurisdictions contributory negli-
gence completely absolves the design professional from liability to a negligent third
party. 399 In comparative negligence jurisdictions successful assertion of the defense
of contributory negligence results in a reduction of the third party's recovery.400
The defense of contributory negligence, then, may be effective to bar a suit or
reduce recovery against the architect if he can show that the injured party's negli-
gence caused or contributed to the injury.40 This theory is based on the view that the
395. See Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir. 1971).
396. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
397. See. e.g., Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961).
398. See, e.g., Johnson v. Equip. Specialists, Inc., 58 11. App. 3d 133. 373 N.E.2d 837 (1978) (builder-designer).
399. See. e.g.. Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth.. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895. 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957)
(plaintiff denied recovery based on the defect being patent (known)). But see the discussion of the latent defects limitation,
supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
400. W. PROSSER. supra note 9, § 67, at 434-36. In a comparative negligence state relative fault is determined, and
damages are based on this finding. For instance, if a defendant is found to be 60% negligent and the plaintiff 40%
negligent, the plaintiff can only recover 60% of the damages sustained. Id.
401. See Johnson v. Equip. Specialists, Inc., 58 III. App. 3d 133, 141, 373 N.E.2d 837, 843 (1978).
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architect should not be fully liable for injuries to a third party who possibly could
have prevented the injury if he had not been negligent. 40 2
C. Contribution or Indemnity
Contribution is not a defense in the strictest sense; it does not preclude the
architect's liability, but it does allow the architect to limit his liability.4 °3 If an
architect successfully asserts a claim for contribution against another party, that party
is required to pay part or all of the damages assessed against the architect. A con-
tractor who built from patently defective plans and an owner who could have pre-
vented an injury because he knew of the defect, but failed to do so, are both candi-
dates for contribution. 40 4 A showing of negligent maintenance by the owner may also
constitute grounds for contribution. Moreover, although the owner's advance ap-
proval of plans does not absolve the architect of liability,40 5 the approval may be a
basis for a claim of contribution against the owner. It is important that an architect be
aware of this possibility of mitigating damages so that all potential parties may be
joined in the action for claims of contribution.
Indemnity, like contribution, is not a defense, but is an attempt to shift the
economic burden of the loss to a party whose fault is greater. Indemnity may arise by
operation of law to prevent an unjust result. For example, when a nonnegligent
architect is held liable for his consulting engineer's negligence because the engineer
is the agent of the architect, the architect may seek indemnity from the engineer.4
0 6
Some jurisdictions are liberal in allowing indemnity by operation of law. 40 7
An allowance of indemnity may depend on a "'passive-active' dichotomy. "408
A party is "actively negligent if he had the 'active or primary role in the negligent
situtation' while he [is] passively negligent if he had only a 'secondary role.",409
Indemnity may be denied unless the party held liable can show that he was a passive
tortfeasor while the other party was an active tortfeasor. If both were active tort-
feasors, indemnity may be denied.410
In the construction area, indemnification arises most often from a contractual
agreement. 4"' It is generally recognized that a contractor may agree to indemnify an
402. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 65, at 417-18.
403. Id. § 50.
404. Comment, supra note 13, at 90.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
406. See American S. Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., 275 Ala. 51, 151 So. 2d 783 (1963).
407. See Fulton Ins. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 261 Or. 206, 493 P.2d 138 (1972).
408. Comment, supra note 13, at 90.
409. Id. at 90 n. 117 (citing Hays-Fendler Constr. Co. v. Traroloc Inv. Co., 521 S.W.2d 17 I, 177 n.8 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975)).
410. See Union Elec. Co. v. Magary, 373 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1963); Pierce v. Ozark Border Elec. Coop., 378 S.W.2d
504 (Mo. 1964).
411. E.g., AMERICAN INSTrrTUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRuCTION
§ 4.18 (AIA Document A201/CM) (1980) (provides for the contractor to indemnify the owner and architect for losses due
solely or partly to the contractor's negligence, subject to some limitations) [hereinafter cited as AIA Document
A201/CM], reprinted in J. LAMBERT & L. WHITE, HANDBOOK OF MODERN CONSTRUCTION LAw at 260, 270 (1982).
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architect against the result of the architect's negligence, but clear and unequivocal
language of this intent is required.4 1 2 The American Institute of Architects has prom-
ulgated a form for such a provision. 41 3 Some states, however, will not allow a party
to seek contractual indemnification for negligence.4
14
Even if a valid contractual provision provides for indemnification, indemnifica-
tion may be denied on the basis of the passive-active dichotomy. If a party is an active
tortfeasor, he may be denied indemnity and granted only contribution even if a
contractual provision grants him indemnification. 415 Again, it is important that the
defendant architect join all parties as third-party defendants in an attempt to provide
for indemnification or contribution when a joint judgment is required. 41 6
D. Statutory Responses
The most important and effective statutory response has been the special statutes
of limitations enacted by the state legislatures.417 These statutes have provided an
effective shield for the architect, but they are not the only possible solution, and other
possible legislative responses should be considered.
One commentator, Milton F. Lunch, has suggested other statutory responses
that would alleviate the liability burden currently placed on design professionals. 4 18
The first recommendation is to require pretrial arbitration before an arbitration panel
made up of three members: a member of the defendant's profession, a lay member,
and an attomey. 4 19 The panel would hear the case and then determine liability and the
amount of any award.420 If either party were dissatisfied, he could seek a de novo
procedure from a trial court, in which the panel's finding would be admissible as
evidence. 42 1 Lunch argued that the panel would "weed out" cases without merit and
provide fair awards better than juries would.4 22
This suggestion does have drawbacks, as Lunch recognized. 423 First, duplicate
costs would be incurred whenever a trial was requested. 424 Second, the con-
stitutionality of a mandatory nonjudicial proceeding prior to suit in court is uncertain
since it would be a condition precedent to the right to file a claim in court.425 Some
412. See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Federal Constr. Corp.. 351 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1961).
413. AIA Document A201/CM, supra note 411, § 4.18.
414. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 316 N.E.2d 51 (1974).
415, See Hays-Fendler Constr. Co. v. Traroloc Inv. Co., 521 S.W.2d 171, 176-77 nn.7-8 (Mo. 1975); see also
supra text accompanying notes 408-10.
416, Comment, supra note 13, at 91.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 86-106.
418. Lunch. The Professional Liability Shuffle, in GUtDELtNES FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE at General Information-
27 (Victor 0. Schinnerer & Co. ed. 1977).
419. Id. at General Information-27(l).
420, Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424, Id.
425. Id.; see Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63111. 2d 313. 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). The court held that the
establishment of review panels to hear medical malpractice claims was unconstitutional since it gave judicial functions to
nonjudicial personnel. Id. at 322, 347 N.E.2d at 740. Further, the court held that the review panels constituted a denial of
the constitutional right to a trial by jury, even though the aggrieved party could take the issue to a jury trial after the panel's
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courts have upheld the creation of pretrial arbitration panels in medical malpractice
cases, but this holding may not be applicable to architects because the courts have
based their decisions on special circumstances in the medical malpractice area.
426
The medical arbitration boards were designed to facilitate the disposition of the
multitide of claims being filed and "'to deal comprehensively with the critical threat
to the health and welfare of the State as a result of the lack of adequate medical
malpractice insurance coverage at reasonable rates.' "427 Legislatures may not view
the position of the architectural profession as sufficiently critical to justify the use of
mandatory arbitration, panels.
Another way to alleviate architects' liability would be to amend the workers'
compensation laws 428 to extend coverage to third-party defendants, including
architects, who are not currently covered by the statutes. 429 This amendment would
limit the amount recoverable by an injured third-party worker to the amount provided
for under the workers' compensation system and would bar workers' suits against
architects. Such a change would probably call for a contribution to the program by the
architect since employers who are protected by the system must pay for this protec-
tion. A further amendment could increase the damages allowed under the workers'
compensation system so that workers will be less likely to seek a "deep pocket."
These amendments would eliminate much of the litigation cost of third-party suits by
substituting recovery under the workers' compensation system.
A third legislative response would be to place a dollar limit on the amount that is
recoverable from an architect in a suit.430 This suggestion raises serious constitutional
questions as a violation of the prohibition on special legislation since it would be an
arbitrary limit that would discriminate against seriously injured persons. 4 31 A closely
related suggestion is that limits could be included in the parties' agreements.432 Such
limitations, however, would not apply to third parties, and many courts may refuse to
enforce the limits on the basis of a finding that such limitations are contrary to public
policy.
4 3 3
decision was rendered. See id. at 322-24, 347 N.E.2d at 740-41. But see Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483. 424 N.E.2d 586(1981).
These cases upheld mandatory arbitration for medical malpractice cases and rejected the constitutional challenges made.
Further, a New York case found constitutional a statutory provision that allowed medical malpractice arbitration panel
recommendations to be admitted as substantive evidence at a subsequent trial proceeding. Comiskey v. Aren. 55 A.D.2d
304. 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976), afTdon oilier grounds. 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977).
426. See. e.g.,. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976), affdon other grounds. 43 N.Y.2d
696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977).
427. Id. at 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30 (quoting Memorandum of State Executive Dept., N.Y. Legis. Ann. 419
(1975)).
428. Lunch, supra note 418, at General Information-27(2); see supra text accompanying notes 107-15.
429. Lunch. supra note 418, at General Information-27(2).
430. Id.
431. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 111. 2d 313, 329-30, 347 N.E.2d 736, 744 (1976). The court
held that a S500,000 limitation on medical malpractice recoveries was unconstitutional as special legislation that placed
arbitrary limits on recoveries.
432. Lunch. supra note 418, at General Information--27(2)-(3).
433. Id.
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A fourth proposal would alter the role that attorneys play in the litigation process
by abolishing the use of contingent fees in cases of professional malpractice. 434 This
would lessen the plaintiffs incentive to sue and would result in suits only in those
cases in which the injured party has a strong case. Contingent fees encourage suits in
which the injured party may find a sympathetic court that is willing to extend the
architect's liability to provide for recovery. Another suggestion is to allow counter-
suits against an attorney who brings a frivolous suit resulting in unnecessary costs to
the architect. Many states have rejected this idea except for circumstances in which
malice on the part of the attorney is shown.435
These recommendations have found little, if any, implementation, and it is
doubtful that they will be enacted in the near future. As a result, the architect must
rely on the traditional defenses4 36 and the special statutes of limitations4 37 for protec-
tion.
VI. EFFECTS OF EXPANSIVE ARCHITECT LIABILITY
The discussion thus far has clearly demonstrated that the architect's liability,
particularly his liability to third parties, has undergone expansion in the last thirty
years. The architect's expanding liability to third parties arises from many sources
and theories, and it presents an uncertain future for the architectural profession. The
architect plainly provides a benefit to society, one that has been called "in-
dispensable." 4 38 One commentator said that "[e]very individual in the United States
benefits from the services of a design professional. Without shelter, the enjoyment of
food, clothing, rest and relaxation would be far less pleasant and questionably
useful.", 4 3 9 The architect's designs provide both aesthetic beauty and structural
soundness. Although injured third parties have an interest in being made whole,
architects' contribution to society may call for a special balancing of the interests of
architects and injured third parties.
The costs to the architect of expanding liability should be considered. An impor-
tant cost is the loss of time that an architect must spend in defending against suits.
While these costs are reasonable when an architect has clearly caused an injury to a
third party, they are unreasonable when they are the result of suits that are tenuous or
based on duties that should not be imposed on architects. 440 An architect provides
services, and his time is a valuable and important commodity that should not be
dismissed lightly. Obviously, someone must pay for the loss of time. Society will
434. Id. at General Information-27(3).
435. Id.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 388-416.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 86-106.
438. Comment, supra note 13, at 97.
439. Comment, Malpractice: The Design Professional's Dilemma, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 287, 311-12
(1977).
440. See supra subpart III(C)(2) (discussion of the architect's duty to supervise construction methods).
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ultimately bear the cost either in increased architectural costs or in unsafe structures
resulting from the lack of time committed by the architects. 4 '
A second cost arises when the architects are held to ever increasing duties, duties
that cause the architect to assume greater responsibilities. 4 2 If the architect un-
dertakes more responsibility and provides more services, surely he will extract a
premium in the form of higher fees. This cost will eventually be passed on to the
consuming public. 44 3 The increased construction costs will take their toll on society
in two forms: (1) inability to afford construction and housing at the personal level,
and (2) unwillingness to build and develop at the commercial level. The questions
that society must ask are whether it wants to bear this cost, and, if so, whether the
architect is the best person to allocate it. 444
The most obvious cost to the architect is that of professional liability insurance.
Although liability insurance is necessary to protect the architect and society, the cost
of maintaining substantial coverage has been skyrocketing" 5 as the architect is sub-
jected to more expansive liability. The cost has become so prohibitive that some
architects have chosen to "go bare" (i.e., practice without liability insurance). 4 46
The high cost of insurance will be passed on to the public and the conscientious
architect will be forced to either reduce his coverage or increase his fees and suffer
the economic consequences. As more architects begin to "go bare," owners will
seek out these architects because of their lower fees, thereby eliminating the necessity
for owners to pass the cost on to their customers. In such a competitive market the
architect must either suffer the loss of business or reduce his costs to compete with
other architects who have liability insurance coverage. The result could be economi-
cally disastrous for the architect." 7 Therefore, the architect is not in the best position
to assume the allocation of these costs.
One could argue that the cost of assuring compensation to injured parties need
not be passed on to the public if it is assumed by someone other than the architect.
From the previous discussion it is clear that many of the duties being placed on
architects are responsibilities previously borne.by others. 4 4 8 If the responsibility for
activities beyond the design function are left to the contractor and owner, who
traditionally bore them, then these parties would have no reason to increase their
costs. However, since these responsibilities are new to the architect and are not
currently included in an architect's fees, the architect burdened with these duties
would necessarily have to increase fees and thus increase the overall construction
costs.
441. See infra text accompanying notes 449-54 (discussion of the architect's new role in the construction process).
442. See supra subpart I1I(c)(2).
443. See infra text accompanying notes 447-49 for an argument that the public may not necessarily have to bear the
additional costs.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 341-49 for a discussion of the relative ability of the architect to allocate
costs and control the construction process or the structure. Although the discussion concerns the application of a strict
liability theory, it is equally applicable to the issue presented here.
445. See Berreby, supra note 344, at 31, col. 4.
446. Id.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 340-45.
448. See supra text part II and subpart 111(C).
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Even if one assumes that the cost ultimately will be borne by the public no
matter who assumes the responsibility, one must consider who is better able to
allocate these costs. A limitation on the liability of architects to third parties would
reduce the potential class of plaintiffs and might limit the number of large recoveries
against architects.' 9 Injured parties should not be prevented from seeking recovery
for their damages, but the architect's, the injured party's, and society's interests
should be balanced. While an injured third party should be entitled to recovery, this
recovery should not be premised on overexpansive views of the architect's role and
abilities.
The diminishing role of the architect in the construction process is another costly
effect of the expansion of liability. One commentator, while discussing the evolution
of the architect's liability, pointed out the changing role of the architect when he said,
"Once towering over the chain of command, demanding authority to control the
work of virtually all who breathed life into their designs, architects now have with-
ered into the shadows . . . . leaving to owners the task of overseeing the
builders."-450 Another commentator believes that the architect has not retreated from
his traditional role,4 5 ' but this view ignores the present realities of the architect's
legal status.
The decisions that have extended the architect's duty, including the duty to
supervise construction methods, 452 purport to be based on contractually imposed
responsibilities, but in reality are based on the actual control exercised by the
architect. 45 3 Given this, the architect's only means of protection is to exercise less
control, which can lead to catastrophic results. Some architects may attempt to reduce
their exposure to liability by taking "a narrow view of their responsibilities" and
relinquishing many powers, a result that could lead to even more unsafe structures
and construction projects for which "'[n]obody's in charge.' ,454 Thus, a limited
role for architects is clearly not in the best interest of society. Appropriate limits must
be set on an architect's liability by balancing the interests of all concerned to de-
termine the proper perspective on the architect's legal status.455
The most important and detrimental effect of the architect's new legal status is
"the chilling effect on creativity.' '456 Architects are most vulnerable when they try
new techniques or methods. 457 Innovation is an essential element of the design
449. See Note. supra note 14. at 318-19. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61 for a discussion of
foresceability tests that balance the interests of all parties and may serve to limit the architect's liability.
450. Davidson. supra note 135, at 20.
451. Types of Professional Liabilit
' 
Clains. supra note 245, at Special Studies-5(3).
452. See generally supra text subpart III(C)(2)..
453. See Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). McGovern v. Standish. 65 II. 2d 54, 357
N.E.2d 1134 (1976); Miller v. Dewitt, 37 111. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). See also supra text accompanying notes
263-92 for a discussion of the rationales behind these decisions. Apparently control, rather than contract language, was
the deciding factor.
454. Berreby, supra note 344, at 30, col. I.
455. An example of the necessary balancing is the foresceability test proposed by one commentator under which
consideration is given to the architect, as well as the injured party. Note. supra note 14, at 318-19; see supra text
accompanying notes 55-61.
456. Note, supra note 14, at 317.
457. Id.
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profession, but it also opens the door to countless potential claims. The nature of the
architectural profession is such that judgments are made based on uncertain con-
ditions458 and the expansion of liability to third parties in such extremes can stifle
architectural creativity. The architect must be permitted to be creative and must be
given the discretion that he requires. 459 If society is willing to sacrifice creativity, the
result will be a design profession that produces only the most practical and efficient
structures that can be planned without involving risks of any great degree. With
simplicity and risk avoidance as the goals of the new breed of architects, this country
will be relegated to a stagnated architectural profession that will avoid innovation at
all costs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The legal status of architects has undergone considerable change throughout
history. As civilizations developed, they recognized that the architect was being
subjected to liability that was severe and excessive. The response was to provide the
architect with ample protection, particularly against third-party actions. The courts
and society later determined that architects were protected too well and began an
assault on that protection, leaving architects subject to expanding liability to third
parties. The fall of privity stripped the architect of his most effective defense, and the
architect found himself open to third-party actions for negligence. 460
The liability exposure expanded as the duty imposed on architects by the courts
became higher. As a designer, the architect is liable for the negligent preparation of
plans and specifications and has a duty to supervise to ensure that these plans and
specifications are properly implemented. These two duties are appropriate since the
architect is in the best position and is the most capable of effectuating these duties
relating to design.4 6'
The extension of an architect's duty to include supervision of construction
methods is not as easily justified. The emphasis of the architect is on design, not
construction. Therefore, supervision of construction methods should not be an
architect's responsibility. While changes in contract terminology might seem to be
the answer, any court looking to expand the architect's duty to provide recovery for
an injured third party would have little difficulty in going beyond the contract
language.4 62
Courts and society have cut away at the architect's immunity until they are again
close to applying a strict liability theory. Indeed, strict liability appears to be the next
logical step since many of the standards and duties imposed on architects appear to
require near perfection. This change in the architect's legal position is a result of the
458. See supra text accompanying note 149.
459. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Cerny & Assocs., 199 F. Supp. 951, 953 (D. Minn. 1961).
460. See supra parts I-II.
461. See supra subparts Ill(B), (C)(I).
462. See generally supra subpart 111(C)(2).
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change in social and judicial attitudes from a view favoring limitations on liability to
a view that favors major expansions of the architect's duties and liabilities.
Given the judiciary's position favoring architectural liability, the architect has an
uphill battle to fight in defending against an allegation of negligence. While the
architect may seek limitation of his dollar losses through contribution and in-
demnity,4 63 this ignores the underlying problem. The legislatures recognized that
liability had gone too far and enacted special statutes of limitations to limit the
architect's exposure to liability. 464 It is this type of recognition that society as a whole
must make.
The architect has sought protection by limiting his authority and by taking a less
active role in the construction process. The price that society pays is the construction
of unsafe structures, higher construction costs, and a chilling effect on creativity.
Society must acknowledge this and move for a change in attitudes toward a view that
limits the duties of architects. By balancing all relevant elements, a middle ground
can be reached that makes a rational and realistic appraisal of the injured party's
interest in being made whole and the role of the architect in society. This more
realistic view of the architect's role can result in a construction industry with the
common goals of providing efficient and practical structures that are both safe and
aesthetically pleasing.
Jeffrey L. Nischwitz
463. See supra subpart V(QC.
464. See supra text accompanying notes 86-106.
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